Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship by Rana, Aziz
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
3-1-2009
Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the
Problem of Democratic Citizenship
Aziz Rana
Cornell Law School, ar643@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rana, Aziz, "Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship" (2009). Cornell Law Faculty
Publications. Paper 31.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/31
RANA FOR PP 3/5/2009 6:22:44 PM 
 
1665 
STATESMAN OR SCRIBE? 
LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
Aziz Rana* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers today find themselves on the defensive, viewed by more and 
more Americans as “simply a plague on society.”1  Public opinion polls 
routinely give attorneys low marks for honesty and ethical standards, 
ranking them behind virtually every occupational group except for 
insurance salesmen, advertising practitioners, and car salesmen.2  Recent 
American Bar Association (ABA) surveys further confirm popular mistrust; 
they report that the profession’s public image falls at or near the bottom of 
all American institutions, ahead only of the media.3  This mistrust captures 
an increasing sentiment among ordinary citizens that lawyers constitute a 
hidden and unelected elite and a threat to democratic ideals.4  While all 
citizens are supposed to have an equal voice in controlling public policy, 
lawyers seemingly embody a separate caste, able to manipulate elected 
representatives and assert undue pressure on political life.  The conservative 
 
* Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law, Yale Law School.  I would like to thank Bruce 
Ackerman, Robert Gordon, Alex Gourevitch, Darryl Li, Odette Lienau, Thomas Merrill, 
Russell Pearce, and Jedediah Purdy for their generous comments on earlier drafts of this 
essay.  I would also like to thank Bruce Green and Fordham Law School for organizing the 
Colloquium on the Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary Democracy as well as all the 
participants for their invaluable reflections and feedback.  Kathleen Lange and the editorial 
team at the Fordham Law Review provided excellent technical and substantive help 
throughout the publication process.  
 1. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1240 
(1991).  
 2. See John Tierney, The Big City; Bar Sinister:  Lawyers Earn Public’s Wrath, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B1. 
 3. See LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., AM. BAR ASS’N, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS 
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 6 (2002) [hereinafter ABA, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS] (reporting 
that only 19% of Americans say they are “extremely” or “very” confident in lawyers, as 
compared to 50% for doctors); see also M/A/R/C RESEARCH, AM. BAR ASS’N, PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1999) (similarly finding that only 14% of respondents 
asserted strong confidence in the legal profession). 
 4. According to one American Bar Association (ABA) study, the decline of 
professional reputation is directly tied to discomfort “with the connections that lawyers have 
with politics, the judiciary, government, big business, and law enforcement.” ABA, PUBLIC 
PERCEPTIONS, supra note 3, at 4.  Americans fear that these connections allow lawyers “not 
only to play the system, but also to shape that very system.” Id. 
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call for tort reform, with its presentation of trial lawyers as wealthy elites 
preying upon middle-class doctors and businessmen, draws much of its 
appeal from these arguments.  According to Walter Olson, an outspoken 
critic of the trial bar, 
 The new rule of lawyers brings us many evils, but perhaps the greatest 
is the way it robs the American people of the right to find its own future 
and pursue its own destiny.  No doubt democratic processes often fall 
short of perfection . . . .  But however uncertain the results of democracy, 
however slow and clumsy its procedures, we can feel quite sure that it is a 
better course than agreeing to turn over our rights of self-government to a 
new class of unaccountable lawyers.5 
Moreover, this skepticism is not the exclusive domain of the American 
Right but extends across the political spectrum.  In recent years, scholars 
and commentators on the left have found themselves in a heated debate 
about the appropriateness of pursuing transformative projects through the 
courts rather than in more popular settings.  Disturbed by the political 
retreat of social movements representing labor interests, racial equality, and 
women’s rights, these left commentators have blamed the turn to the 
judiciary (and the dominance of lawyers within these movements) as partly 
responsible for the collapse of mass backing and participation.  The late 
social historian Christopher Lasch maintained that, 
The great liberal victories—desegregation, affirmative action, legislative 
reapportionment, legalized abortion—were won largely in the courts, not 
in Congress, in the state legislatures, or at the polls.  Instead of seeking to 
create popular consensus behind these reforms, liberals pursued their 
objective by indirect methods, fearing that popular attitudes remained 
unreconstructed.6 
In his view, because lawyers—rather than the public at large—drove the 
enactment of such policies, they have been on shaky democratic footing 
ever since.7  Within legal academia, Gerald Rosenberg is perhaps best 
known for articulating these claims.8  He sees lawyer-driven reform as 
inevitably facing a democratic deficit, in which an elite bar imposes its ends 
on the public without ever gathering a meaningful mandate:   “When courts 
decide things, for better or worse, I think that many Americans feel they are 
 
 5. WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS:  HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE 
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW 313–14 (2003). 
 6. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN:  PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 37 
(1991). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Gerald Rosenberg’s book, The Hollow Hope, presents a left critique of Brown v. 
Board of Education and the capacity of court action to alter social life dramatically. GERALD 
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 
2008) (arguing that the ruling had no meaningful effect on precipitating the end of 
segregation in the South). 
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unaccountable.  They feel helpless.  They feel there’s little they can do.  
And that creates a sense of outrage.”9 
Confronted with the charge of being antidemocratic by both the Right 
and the Left, the modern legal profession appears gripped by a generalized 
version of the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”10  Over forty years ago, 
Alexander Bickel argued that when the U.S. Supreme Court declares 
legislative acts to be unconstitutional, “it thwarts the will of representatives 
of the actual people . . . it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing 
majority, but against it.”11  Similarly, today’s claim that the profession as a 
whole faces a democratic deficit implies that whenever lawyers employ the 
courts to pursue their own political objectives, they usurp the authority of 
elected leaders and challenge the self-government of citizens.  These views 
have clearly struck a sensitive nerve within the profession.  In an effort to 
improve its public image, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
(ATLA) recently changed its name to the far vaguer American Association 
of Justice (AAJ).12  In fact, the suspicion that including the word “lawyer” 
in the title of an advocacy group may undermine its popular support has 
affected more than just the trial bar.  Even a public interest 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) like the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights concluded that a name change, in this case to Human Rights 
First, may be the best way to communicate with a public that is skeptical of 
the profession.13 
In legal ethics, the problem of the bar’s democratic illegitimacy manifests 
itself in a persistent disagreement about which principles should govern the 
activity of lawyering.  In particular, it shapes a key debate about how to 
address the tension between an attorney’s duties to her clients and to the 
public interest writ large.  On one side are those who maintain that lawyers 
should balance client loyalty with a moral commitment to justice and a 
pursuit of valuable social ends.14  They emphasize that, according to the 
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are not only client 
representatives but are also public citizens and officers of the legal 
 
 9. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster:  Looking for Change in All the Wrong 
Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 819 (2006). 
 10. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–28 (1962). 
 11. Id. at 17. 
 12. Ann Knef, ATLA Drops ‘Trial Lawyer,’ Adds ‘Justice’ to Name, W. VA. REC., July 
19, 2006.  This move led Lisa Rickert, president of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform, to crow that the name change represented “‘an astounding admission of the 
unpopularity of trial lawyers in America.’” Id. (quoting Lisa A. Rickert, President, U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform). 
 13. See Human Rights First, Human Rights First Is the New Name of the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about 
_us/name_change/name_change.htm. 
 14. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Robert 
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. Simon, 
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). 
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system.15  On the other side are those who defend an ideal of “‘zealous 
advocacy within the bounds of the law,’”16 and contend that attorneys 
should be strongly partisan and motivated by a primary focus on client 
autonomy.17  These critics of legal independence, found on both the left and 
the right, cast the promotion of the bar’s moral autonomy in a harsh light.  
They argue that ethical independence from clients and an orientation toward 
the lawyer’s distinct vision of justice or the public interest is tantamount to 
client domination.18  Such domination allegedly reproduces in the 
representational context precisely the fears of elite control and 
unaccountability that mark the bar’s larger democratic predicament in 
public life. 
If anything, the presumption of a democracy deficit has placed supporters 
of a morally reflective practice in the unenviable position of offering an 
apology for professional power.  Since legal practice’s underlying lack of 
popular legitimacy is largely taken for granted, scholars are inevitably 
trapped into presenting either an explicit or an implicit defense of elite 
politics.  The most common version of this defense reconceives the lawyer 
ideal as one of “statesmanship” rather than zealous advocacy.19  It laments 
the bar’s decline from a class of “social trustee[s]”20 who were once 
“guardian[s] of our material interests and political culture”21 to little more 
than technical experts and autonomy agents—“a species of office 
management whose main virtue is efficiency rather than wisdom.”22  Some 
supporters appear to do away almost entirely with the pretense of 
reconciling legal independence with democratic equality.  Geoffrey Hazard, 
in his seminal piece, The Future of Legal Ethics, at one point waxes poetic 
about the benefits of aristocracy and elite rule, remarking that, “As a 
 
 15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2001). 
 16. For a description of this view, see W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 
COLUM. L. REV 363, 364 (2004). See also Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting 
Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 52 (2003). 
 17. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 57 (1990) (“[T]he 
attorney acts unprofessionally and immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy . . . by 
otherwise preempting their moral decisions, or by depriving them of the ability to carry out 
their lawful decisions.”); see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:  The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976); Stephen L. 
Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role:  A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614. 
 18. But see William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering:  A Comment 
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1099, 1101 (1994).  In the article, Simon describes and ultimately rejects the call for client 
empowerment among poverty lawyers. Id.  According to him, this call is tied to concerns 
that the bar unduly dominates its poor clients, substituting professional interests for those of 
marginalized communities. Id. 
 19. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
 20. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS:  THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN 
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 9 (1994). 
 21. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 209, 277 (2003). 
 22. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 4. 
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constitutional matter, Tocqueville could be right that the ‘aristocratic’ 
element—composed of a legal profession or other groups—serves the long-
run good of society if it is suitably organized and restrained.”23 
Ultimately, the prevailing debate leaves lawyers with a stark choice:  they 
must decide between becoming statesmen or scribes, either standing above 
most Americans or rigidly enacting a client’s will, more or less irrespective 
of its ethical content.  In conflating the activity of legal citizenship with an 
elevated status as a lawyer-guardian, proponents of professional 
independence often ignore the basic democratic premise that caring for the 
public must be a cooperative endeavor—one in which all individuals share 
jointly in the responsibilities of decision making.  At the other extreme, 
client-centered accounts reduce the lawyer to simply a scribe or 
functionary, particularly when the client is a large corporate entity.  They 
reach the problematic conclusion that respecting democracy requires 
adherence to neutral partisanship regardless of whether one’s actions 
actually undermine the foundations of popular self-rule.  As a consequence, 
neither approach provides a truly democratic ethos for lawyers, one that 
informs both their legal practice and their broader public commitments as 
citizens equally charged with maintaining common institutions. 
While scholarship in legal ethics by and large presupposes a claim about 
the lawyer’s democratic deficit, I argue that professional independence is 
not in tension with, but in fact is crucial to core principles of self-rule.  In a 
sense, both sides of the current debate operate within a limited account of 
democratic imagination, which in practice forces lawyers to choose between 
adhering to democratic principles and exercising their independent 
judgment.  Client-centered perspectives often reduce self-government 
simply to electoral mechanisms and formal procedures.  And rather than 
expanding the substantive meaning of democracy beyond these formal 
characteristics, proponents of moral independence tend to present robust 
citizenship as the domain of elites. 
Without a richer political theory of self-government, the debate in legal 
ethics remains subject to a seemingly irreconcilable binary.  As such, this 
essay does not offer a new interpretation of the rules, but instead suggests a 
stronger and more coherent theoretical grounding for those who wish to 
defend the lawyer as an autonomous moral agent.  I argue that embedded in 
the very nature of legal practice is an irreducible degree of discretion, in 
which lawyers face unavoidable conflicts about how to situate their clients’ 
objectives within a host of competing social ends.  Moreover, lawyers 
cannot evade these choices by imagining themselves as mere instruments 
for the expression of an already formed and coherent client will.  Central to 
the very nature of legal work is a basic question:  How should the attorney 
 
 23. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1277 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (J. P. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) 
(1835)). 
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relate to her own discretionary activity and what principles should guide her 
exercise of judgment? 
This essay offers a preliminary answer by locating discussions of legal 
ethics within a broader American democratic tradition, one which is too 
often subsumed in today’s public discourse.24  According to this alternative 
tradition, democracy embodies a collective exercise in continuous and 
extensive self-rule in all social institutions.  Such ideals do not detach 
political life from economic life, and imagine work as both a permanent 
education in citizenship and a central site for the everyday practice of moral 
reflection.  Instead of conceiving of the legal profession as an aristocratic 
caste distinct from most Americans, thinkers in this tradition—including 
William Manning, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey—rejected any 
separation between learning and labor, and presented legal practice as one 
among many forms of ethical and autonomous work.  Viewed through this 
political lens, the professional crisis of democratic legitimacy is not the 
product of legal independence per se.  Rather, it is the result of long-term 
social trends that have undermined the institutional supports for a more 
expansive democratic culture and thus disconnected legal practice, 
particularly among the elite bar, from popular forms of work and political 
participation.  This essay attempts to situate the modern profession within a 
larger democratic ethos, while acknowledging the degree to which ethical 
autonomy has diminished across economic and political settings.  Drawing 
from an earlier tradition, it sketches out implications for the bar’s role in 
society and highlights moral standards that might guide the contemporary 
lawyer’s own discretionary activity.  In developing this argument, it 
underscores a fact about legal discretion that none of the prevailing ethical 
approaches fully appreciates.  Any attempt to articulate the legitimacy of 
professional independence is necessarily incomplete without a meaningful 
account of the political community within which lawyers exercise their 
judgment. 
In addition, I aim to address practicing attorneys in two ways.  First, I 
hope to strengthen the willingness of lawyers to engage in ethical reflection 
by offering a more compelling normative defense of morally aware legal 
representation—one that is grounded in a democratic political theory and 
that directly confronts countermajoritarian charges.  Unlike notions of legal 
statesmanship, the defense I offer here employs an American political 
tradition that underscores the centrality of professional autonomy to robust 
citizenship.  According to this vision, when corporate attorneys engage their 
clients in practices of ethical counseling or refuse to create elaborate tax 
schemes that contradict the spirit of the law, they actually fulfill a basic 
democratic function.  Consistent with the hopes of Manning, Lincoln, and 
Dewey, these actions see work as a space in which individuals cultivate 
 
 24. For more on the emergence and continued relevance of early American ideals of 
democratic practice and citizenship, especially their connections to the experience of 
colonial settlement and imperial expansion, see generally AZIZ RANA, SETTLER EMPIRE AND 
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (forthcoming 2010). 
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habits of responsibility and continually reflect on the moral and political 
implications of their own activities.  Regardless of practice setting, lawyers 
have an obligation to balance client interests with ethical considerations. 
Second, I maintain that lawyers should employ their professional 
discretion to expand the capacities of Americans to exercise economic and 
political autonomy.  In many routine forms of legal practice, the 
opportunity to promote popular discretion and authority may not exist.  But 
precisely because lawyers operate at the intersection of law, politics, and 
bureaucracy—whether they work in public interest litigation, administrative 
and regulatory practices, class action contexts, or matters of criminal law—
questions of citizen engagement and control are more prevalent than one 
might initially suppose.  To the extent that opportunities do arise, lawyers 
can help develop institutional solutions that deepen popular participation 
and draw on the knowledge and involvement of local communities.  Such a 
representational approach will not provide a panacea for overcoming the 
bar’s larger crisis of legitimacy or for ensuring that all acts of discretion 
fulfill democratic obligations.25  Still, if attorneys infuse their practice with 
substantive ethical commitments, these practitioners can embody both an 
example of democratic lawyering and a method for reforming the bar’s 
relationship to the wider community of citizens. 
In Part II, I explore in greater detail the limits of the current debate in 
legal ethics about moral autonomy.  In particular, I argue that most accounts 
of independence—even those that defend the ideal of a “people’s lawyer”—
fall back on a version of republican elitism that inevitably distinguishes the 
activity of ruling from the practices of everyday participation.  Part III then 
turns to the vision of democratic culture defended by Lincoln and others in 
which work provided an ethical training for citizenship as well as a crucial 
arena for its exercise.  This discussion compares today’s claims regarding 
client domination with classic Jeffersonian and Jacksonian arguments about 
the bar’s elitism.  Such nineteenth-century Democrats believed that legal 
privilege, entrenched by specialized education and powerful bar 
associations, transformed lawyers into mere dependents of wealthy 
benefactors unable to distinguish between gentry interests and the public 
good.  Unlike today’s critics of professional power, these previous thinkers 
condemned lawyers for failing to demonstrate enough independent moral 
judgment—which they saw as integral to popular self-rule. 
I return in Part IV to the question of why the profession faces a crisis of 
democratic legitimacy.  I argue that the prevailing suspicion of lawyers 
cannot be solved through changes in legal ethics rules alone.  It is the 
product of discontent with a broader political development:  the division in 
American life between neutralized citizens and empowered experts.  This 
shift is, in large part, the consequence of the increasing hierarchy and 
 
 25. These problems are deeply entrenched; they are the product of massive sociological 
changes and are in many ways inherent in the nature of modern professional work (whether 
undertaken by doctors, engineers, or lawyers). 
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complexity that mark modern political and economic administration.  
Lawyers have borne the brunt of public opposition to these developments 
due to the profession’s unique role at the intersection of law and politics.  
As I discuss extensively—through a rereading of Walter Lippmann and an 
assessment of recent legal ethics scholarship—such changes clearly threaten 
the vision of a local, highly participatory community espoused throughout 
the nineteenth century.  However, Part IV also underscores what remains 
plausible about this more democratic mode of lawyering.  In the context of 
energetic and engaged social movements, it emphasizes the importance for 
the legal profession of employing its own discretion to expand the capacity 
of the public to act informally and spontaneously to challenge entrenched 
hierarchies.  I present this argument by exploring how lawyers have 
defended the right to strike—one such example of discretionary popular 
power—and by outlining how the democratic ethos for which I argue might 
in practice influence an attorney’s representational approach. 
The goal of this discussion is to highlight the extent to which an 
alternative theory of politics and law sheds light on the potential challenges 
facing modern lawyers concerned with the status of democracy.  By way of 
a conclusion, I describe the democratic function that lawyers can play when 
social movements are in retreat—a circumstance far more akin to our 
current moment.  With the participatory institutions that undergirded labor 
and civil rights activism steadily eroding, lawyers can no longer simply 
protect the spaces for informal protest and uphold constraints on 
bureaucratic power.  Given the bar’s position in legal and political life, 
attorneys have a professional responsibility to participate in rebuilding the 
institutional frameworks within which citizens can assert their voice and 
intervene in collective decision making.  At the macrolevel, this means 
orienting courts toward citizens by simplifying key elements of the legal 
system, in the process more broadly dispersing ethical autonomy and 
political agency.  In fact, lawyers should view such efforts as part of a wider 
effort to link administrative and regulatory policy to participatory modes of 
governance.  Such governance would ideally combine the benefits of 
centralized accountability with the extensive devolution of actual control to 
those local constituencies directly affected by economic, social, and 
environmental concerns. 
At the microlevel of daily practice, I suggest how the activities of popular 
organizing embody a means by which lawyers can integrate a democratic 
ethos within particular representational contexts.  Class action litigation 
pertaining to school desegregation provides a useful lens for appreciating 
how this approach not only serves democratic ends but better fulfills 
professional duties of client representation.  As a final note, these 
discussions of lawyers and organizing are not meant to exhaust the realm of 
democratic lawyering, but are offered as initial illustrations of how such 
practices might operate in one particular legal setting.  In the end, to escape 
the statesman-scribe binary, any attempt to defend the attorney’s moral 
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independence must emphasize how everyday choices made by lawyers can 
create the environment for effective collective action and control. 
I.  DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP AND THE CALL FOR INDEPENDENCE 
The debate about whether lawyers should be client-centered autonomy 
agents or ethically independent actors implicitly rests on a foundational 
disagreement in political theory about the nature of citizenship.  Those 
arguing for independence almost always read legal education and practice 
as preparation for the exercise of public leadership.  As such, they 
differentiate between the requirements and experiences of elite as opposed 
to popular forms of participation.  In the following sections, I demonstrate 
how these arguments resonate with a republican tradition that emphasizes 
the benefits of “natural aristocracy.”  The consequence is that even 
advocates who wish to reconcile professional power with democratic values 
inevitably find themselves constructing an apology for political elitism.  
These arguments begin from presumptions about the distinctive leadership 
capacities of the bar and then proceed to demonstrate how best to situate 
such necessary leadership within the framework of equality.  As a result, 
only client-centered accounts appear to take seriously the democratic 
importance of undifferentiated citizenship, but at the cost of claiming that 
lawyers should assert minimal discretionary judgment.  If the republican 
tradition presents lawyers as uniquely capable of wielding collective 
authority, the call for client autonomy reaches the opposite, yet equally 
problematic, conclusion:  that the profession is the one social group 
uniquely disempowered from asserting its voice in public life.  In essence, 
both approaches to the profession’s ethical duties presuppose a political 
theory that is incompatible with more substantive accounts of the lawyer’s 
democratic citizenship. 
A.  Natural Aristocracy and Republican Faith in Lawyers 
In order to appreciate how ethical questions about legal practice imply 
normative claims about citizenship, it is necessary to take a step back and 
look more closely at the republican vision of natural aristocracy.  Perhaps 
the best place to begin is with the idea’s cultural and political emergence in 
the years following the American Revolution.  During the colonial period, a 
common republican position maintained that a well-functioning social order 
rested on virtue and thus required that political rulers transcend their own 
partiality and act on the basis of the general good.26  As Lasch wrote, 
 
 26. Along with virtue, the other central element of republicanism was the notion of 
balance in government.  Following Aristotle’s classification, traditional republicans 
distinguished regimes by whether they lodged power in the one, the few, or the many, with 
each form embodying sources of potential corruption. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 51–81 
(Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).  Thus, the goal of political construction 
was “to work out some principle of balance that would combine the advantages of each 
while nullifying the features that made them oppressive.” LASCH, supra note 6, at 173.  
Political theorist Philip Pettit writes that, for classical republicans, government actions 
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according to elite republicans, “virtue implied the fullest development of 
human capacities and powers.  They condemned a life devoted to the 
pursuit of wealth and private comforts, not because it was selfish, but 
because it provided insufficient scope for the ambition to excel.”27  Under 
this framework, political activity was both an education in virtue—through 
the Aristotelian experience of ruling and being ruled in turn—and the 
primary arena for its display.  For such republicans, this focus on achieving 
excellence through action in the public sphere provoked grave suspicions 
about the drive for wealth acquisition or material well-being:  
“Republicanism condemned self-seeking when it tempted men to value the 
external rewards of excellence more highly than the thing itself or to bend 
the rules governing a given practice to their own immediate advantage.”28  
As a result, most members of the polity, especially ordinary laborers, were 
too bound to economic necessity—and thus too wedded to material self-
interest—to exercise power in the name of excellence rather than personal 
advantage.  This politics of virtue meant that a specific social group had to 
be separated out and designated as guardians of the larger polity. 
In common seventeenth-century English accounts, only those few who 
were already wealthy and landed enough to be removed from material 
concerns should wield political responsibility.  As owners of property, such 
elites held a continuous stake in collective life and were best situated to 
think in terms of the long-run interests of the larger polity.  This linkage 
between virtue and property meant that traditional republicans were highly 
skeptical of democratic principles of majority rule or of broadening voting 
rights beyond a limited community of landholders.  As Henry Ireton, Oliver 
Cromwell’s son-in-law, argued during the 1647 Putney Debates of the 
English Civil War, general well-being and social order would crumble if 
citizenship was seen as a birthright and suffrage extended to all white 
males.  Since only landed elites had “a permanent fixed interest in [the] 
Kingdome,” they alone had the necessary virtue to combine participation 
with political excellence.29  Echoing these sentiments a century and a half 
later, Seth Ames, the son of arch-Federalist Fisher Ames, declared that 
 
promoted liberty only “so long as they respect people’s common interests and ideas and 
conform to the image of an ideal law:  so long as they are not the instruments of any one 
individual’s, or any one group’s, arbitrary will.” PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:  A THEORY 
OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 36 (1997).  In other words, the one, the few, and the many 
represented factions within society whose interests were not equivalent to the common good.  
Thus, true law had to result from a balancing process, in which the creation of a “mixed 
regime” would check attempts by partial groups to impose arbitrarily their own will on the 
collective. Id. at 20. 
 27. LASCH, supra note 6, at 174. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Barbara Taft, From Reading to Whitehall:  Henry Ireton's Journey, in THE PUTNEY 
DEBATES OF 1647:  THE ARMY, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH STATE 175, 184 (Michael 
Mendle ed., 2001) (quoting Henry Ireton).  The debate between Oliver Cromwell and Henry 
Ireton and their more radical officers over the relationship between citizenship and voting 
offers one of the great political discussions of equality and political participation.  For more 
on the Putney Debates, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:  THE QUEST FOR 
INCLUSION 44–46 (1991). 
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democracy was little more than class rule by the poor—those too 
economically dependent to think in terms of the common weal—and that it 
reduced political decision making to “present popular passions, independent 
of the public good.”30  Accordingly, statecraft had to be insulated from a 
self-interested public and placed in the hands of a virtuous and hereditary 
elite. 
Nonetheless, for the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, the revolutionary 
experience and the increasing political influence of small farmers and 
artisans31 underscored the impossibility of limiting political power to a 
coterie of gentry elites and powerful families.  The Framers appreciated that 
the new political community would have to be grounded in the democratic 
principle of majority rule and expand the domains of citizenship and voting.  
Still, profound skepticism regarding the capacities and interests of most 
ordinary individuals ran deep; as political theorist Sheldon Wolin writes, 
“[T]he Founders, almost without exception, believed that democratic 
majority rule posed the gravest threat to a republican system.”32  In the 
Federalist Papers, James Madison famously remarked that, “Had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates[,] every Athenian assembly would still 
have been a mob.”33  In essence, popular political involvement in the 
activity of ruling inevitably reduced the general good to the partisan 
commitments of the laboring masses.  Thus, the great challenge facing 
Madison and others was to devise political institutions that protected 
majority rule and yet, at the same time, ensured that collective decision 
making would not be held hostage to the vagaries of public opinion.  “[I]n 
order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude,” Madison 
believed that it was essential to create a detached national government that 
divided sovereignty across multiple branches.34  Ideally, these institutional 
arrangements would limit popular pressure and, as Bruce Ackerman notes, 
“economize on virtue”—i.e., reduce the necessity for good government to 
rest on the public-mindedness and wisdom of ordinary people.35 
Still, even if the system of government restrained popular power and 
successfully economized on virtue, no political framework could ever do 
without virtue entirely.  To guard against threats to public well-being, there 
 
 30. J. T. Kirkland, Memoir, in 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 21 (Seth Ames ed., 1854). 
 31. Historian Robert Wiebe describes the 1770s and 1780s as a period of rising 
egalitarian commitments, marked by the diffusion of political control and the creation of “[a] 
multitude of small political units, governmental and quasi-governmental, [which] rushed to 
fill the vacuum of British authority, [and] resisted the pulls from patriot capitals almost as 
stubbornly as they resisted the British.” ROBERT WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN 
SOCIETY:  FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 3 (1984); see 
also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1991) (arguing 
that the American Revolution was a deeply radical event because it dramatically increased 
social equality among the colonists and undermined preexisting status hierarchies). 
 32. SHELDON S. WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED:  MANAGED DEMOCRACY AND THE 
SPECTER OF INVERTED TOTALITARIANISM 229 (2008). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 300 (James Madison) (J. R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 198–99 (1991). 
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still needed to be a group within society that stood independent of the 
dominant and competing factions and thus remained able to act on the basis 
of disinterested and autonomous reflection.  For the Founders, prevailing 
egalitarian sentiment meant that such public excellence could no longer be 
tied to a hereditary aristocracy, grounded in wealth and property and 
enjoying special political privileges.  As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter 
to John Adams, the only solution was the creation of a natural aristocracy, 
in which those individuals with the greatest “virtue and talents” nurtured 
their capacities through proper training and gained election to positions of 
leadership.36  Jefferson concluded, 
The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for 
the instruction, the trusts, and government of society.  And indeed it 
would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the 
social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to 
manage the concerns of the society.  May we not even say that that form 
of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure 
selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?37 
In Jefferson’s efforts to combine republican commitments to virtue with 
the democratic principle of majority rule, he provided the foundation for a 
new mode of stratified citizenship.  For Ireton, citizenship and political self-
rule were the exclusive domain of property owners, depicted as the sole 
body with a fixed interest in the community’s welfare.  By contrast, 
Jefferson argued that citizenship was a broad right, carrying far different 
responsibilities depending on one’s position in society.  For the ordinary 
laborer, the citizen’s basic function was to recognize and elect wise 
leaders—those better suited by training and intellect to wield actual 
political power.  As for the talented few, citizenship meant holding office or 
positions of public importance and entailed the exercise of direct political 
participation—the Aristotelian vision of ruling and being ruled in turn.  
While such republicanism may have done away with hereditary nobility, it 
still presumed that collective decision making had to be separated from the 
public at large and controlled by responsible elites. 
Yet, the question remained:  Which social body would provide the 
backbone for the new political leadership?  Given that lawyers at the 
founding, in the words of Robert Gordon, “furnished a disproportionate 
share of Revolutionary statesmen, dominated high offices . . . and the 
organs of elite literary culture, had more occasions even than ministers for 
public oratory, and were the most facile and authoritative interpreters of 
laws and constitutions,” it followed that they inevitably claimed the mantle 
of a natural aristocracy and with it the republican ideal of political 
excellence.38  As members of a learned profession, bound by practical 
 
 36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28. 1813), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 568–69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Gordon, supra note 14, at 14 (citing ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 11, 17, 66–72, 77–78 (1984); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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knowledge rather than wealth or landed interests, leading lawyers of the age 
saw themselves as the entity best able to constrain popular passion and to 
protect the republican system of government.  Articulating the special 
standing of the bar and the presumed need for a natural aristocracy, 
Alexander Hamilton wrote, 
Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to 
the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to 
prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as 
it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?39 
While the Federalists themselves never overtly described why groups 
such as the bar should assume the responsibilities of political decision 
making, Alexis de Tocqueville made explicit the ties between elite 
citizenship and specialized education.  Tocqueville believed that the United 
States was dominated by the two parties that “have divided mankind since 
free societies came into existence,” namely, the few and the many or the 
aristocratic and democratic elements.40  In his view, lawyers were clearly 
members of the elite few and enjoyed “the tastes and habits of an 
aristocracy.”41  In particular, legal education and training underscored the 
distinct social experience and values that constituted the life of a learned 
professional as opposed to that of a farmer or wage earner.  “Study and 
specialized knowledge of the law give a man a rank apart in society and 
make of lawyers a somewhat privileged intellectual class.  The exercise of 
their profession daily reminds them of this superiority; they are the masters 
of a necessary and not widely understood science . . . .”42  Moreover, 
special education did more than promote a sense of superiority; it provided 
training in political decision making that developed both the skills of 
rulership and an appropriate skepticism toward the judgment of everyday 
laborers.  In essence, it made lawyers a natural aristocracy, whose talents, 
rather than unearned wealth or sheer power, distinguished them from both 
the landed gentry and the broader public.  Equipped with this background, 
for Tocqueville, lawyers “serve[d] as arbiters between the citizens; and the 
habit of directing the blind passions of the litigants toward the objective 
[gave] them a certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd.”43  He 
concluded that the legal profession was the one aristocratic body that could 
“unforcedly mingle with elements natural to democracy and combine with 
them on comfortable and lasting terms.”44  As a consequence, he believed 
that the “permitted influence” of the bar would check the excesses of 
 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:  THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986); MAGALI 
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 283 n.45 
(1956)). 
 39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 40. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 178 (J. P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1988). 
 41. Id. at 264. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 266. 
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popular passion and over time provide “the strongest [barrier] against the 
faults of democracy.”45 
At the heart of arguments that linked Madison and Hamilton to 
Tocqueville was a basic assumption about the irrationality of ordinary 
citizens.  While the populace embodied an indistinct mass, prey to its own 
self-interest and subject to demagoguery, the new natural aristocracy was 
taken to be composed of “rational actors,”46 who, in the words of Sheldon 
Wolin, “weigh counterevidence carefully, employ power judiciously, and, 
above all, consider the consequences of a course of action, especially if it 
involves grave risks or harm.”47  This distinction between the abilities of 
learned professionals and citizens indicated a troubling distaste for the 
attitudes of most Americans, who were depicted as fundamentally 
incorrigible.  Equally disconcerting, it rested on the proposition that entities 
such as the bar, itself rife with partiality and self-seeking behavior, could 
and properly should embody a universal class.  Still, as the next sections 
explore, despite these normative shortcomings, versions of republican 
elitism have come to dominate current defenses of the lawyer’s moral and 
political independence in legal ethics. 
B.  The Lawyer-Statesman and Elite Despondency 
Potentially the most well-known defense of the lawyer’s moral and 
political independence, presented by Anthony Kronman’s The Lost Lawyer, 
relies heavily on such elite republicanism.  Kronman’s primary concern 
revolves around whether legal practice continues to be a noble calling or 
has instead devolved into a form of expert labor indifferent to social ends.48  
He views the debate in legal ethics about how to balance duties to clients 
with those to the public writ large as suggesting a much more profound 
“crisis of values”—one that goes to the heart of the professional 
experience.49  In reality, however, this existential crisis is limited to the 
most prestigious elements of the bar, some of whom worry that the 
profession no longer plays the role of the natural aristocracy imagined by 
Hamilton and Tocqueville.  These arguments may well be right about the 
decline of a service ethic in the profession.  Yet, by tying a defense of the 
lawyer’s independence to the reclamation of her lost status as a social 
guardian, the statesmanship discourse ends up presenting autonomous 
reflection and moral deliberation as the purview of elite actors. 
 
 45. Id. at 263. 
 46. WOLIN, supra note 32, at 182. 
 47. Id. 
 48. This is not unlike a series of empirical studies in the sociology of the profession also 
published in the mid-1990s.  Of particular note are BRINT, supra note 20, and ELLIOT A. 
KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS:  PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 
1930 TO THE PRESENT (1996), which each argue that professional work as a whole is 
increasingly transforming into expertise-for-hire due to market pressures and changes in 
state policy. 
 49. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 4. 
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In Kronman’s account, legal practice today seems reduced to an adjunct 
of either business or government, and lawyers are neither publicly minded 
statesmen nor even centrally motivated by this ideal.  Kronman argues that 
attorneys face a deep uneasiness that “is the product of growing doubts 
about the capacity of a lawyer’s life to offer fulfillment to the person who 
takes it up”50 and for the professional to be not just “an accomplished 
technician but a person of prudence or practical wisdom as well.”51  He 
hearkens back to an earlier period when lawyers took pride in the intrinsic 
worth of their profession, which at its best embodied the character virtues of 
independence, political sensitivity, and moderation.  Rather than being 
bound to client interest, professionalism in this era emphasized “the need 
for deliberative judgment and a public-spirited concern for the good of the 
law as a whole.”52  Echoing these sentiments, the late Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist lamented that, while great lawyers like Thomas Jefferson, 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and Abraham Lincoln 
“played a vital, perhaps a transcendent, role in steering the ship of state 
through the shoals that confronted it,” most successful attorneys in 
contemporary life appeared uninterested in the greater good or public 
service.53 
Despite the claim that legal practice as a whole faces a crisis of values 
and morale, Kronman overstates professional unhappiness among most 
lawyers.  In the bar generally, there are few signs of existential malaise.  
Rather than mourning the loss of a noble calling, a slate of recent studies 
finds that practitioners are overwhelmingly content with their career 
choices.  Data tracking attorneys who were admitted to the bar in 2000 
reported that 80% of respondents expressed satisfaction with their 
occupation, leading the researchers to conclude that “there is no evidence in 
the AJD [(After the JD)] data of any pervasive unhappiness in the 
profession.”54  Such statistics mirror the findings of John Heinz and his 
coauthors in their far-reaching work on lawyers in Chicago.55  If anything, 
 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 167 (citing Maxwell Bloomfield, Law and Lawyers in American Popular 
Culture, in LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 132–43 (Carl S. 
Smith et al. eds., 1983)). 
 53. William H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 537, 537 (1986). 
 54. RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD:  FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
LEGAL CAREERS 47 (2004). 
 55. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR 257 (2005) [hereinafter HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS] (reporting that a 1995 survey 
revealed that 84% of all Chicago lawyers were satisfied or very satisfied with their work).  In 
a previous article, John Heinz and his coauthors describe as “dreadful” most of the evidence 
cited for the low morale of lawyers. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and Their Discontents:  
Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 736 (1999).  They see the 
declension thesis as a stock narrative of the profession, with little grounding in current 
circumstances. Id. at 735 n.3.  “Every generation of lawyers appears to think that the golden 
era of the bar occurred just before they entered it.  (Understandably, however, they never 
make the obvious cause-and-effect inference.)” Id. 
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the central concern of most ordinary lawyers is that monetary rewards and 
career options are deeply stratified between an elite bar where “business is 
booming” and a lower tier of solo and small-firm practitioners.56  Among 
the latter groups, inflation-adjusted income has actually remained flat since 
the 1980s or, for some, has even dropped in the last five years.57  Today, 
more and more recent law graduates who do not finish at the top of their 
class or attend highly ranked schools find themselves “taking temporary 
contract work, reviewing documents for as little as $20 an hour, without 
benefits.”58  For these attorneys, who took out sizeable student loans on the 
promise of enjoying big firm salaries, the hope was precisely to become 
well-paid expert laborers.  Thus, their problem with the profession is not the 
collapse of meaning but a lack of opportunities and an unequal division of 
the spoils.59 
In a sense, worries about the future of law as a noble calling speak more 
to despondency among the elite bar than to any generalized dissatisfaction.  
Writing and commentary in this vein has been the product of the most 
distinguished voices within the profession, including Supreme Court 
justices, law school deans, and bar association task forces.60  One could 
argue that this despondency reflects status anxiety among top lawyers, who 
fear that their professional respectability and social standing have become 
compromised by market dictates and state supervision.  Social critic and 
nonlawyer Fareed Zakaria, in his book The Future of Freedom, powerfully 
encapsulates these concerns about the bar’s lost authority.  He concludes, 
“[L]ook at America’s professional elites—lawyers, most notably—who 
once formed a kind of local aristocracy with duties and responsibilities 
toward their towns and cities.  They have lost their prestige and public 
purpose, becoming anxious hustlers.”61 
 
 56. See Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 
287, 287 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002). 
 57. Amir Efrati, Hard Case:  Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
24, 2007, at A1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Amir Efrati’s evocative piece in the Wall Street Journal captures the experience and 
fears of one recent graduate of Chicago-Kent College of Law. Id.  “Despite graduating near 
the top half of her class, she has been unable to find a job and is doing temp work 
‘essentially as a paralegal,’ she says. ‘A lot of people, including myself, feel frustrated about 
the lack of jobs,’ she says.” Id. (quoting Sue Clark, 2007 graduate of Chicago-Kent School 
of Law). 
 60. A classic illustration of this elite despondency comes from the late Chief Justice 
Warren Burger’s famous lament that lawyers suffered from a “decline in public confidence” 
because they had repudiated their obligations to the public good and thus faced a crisis of 
professionalism. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 62.  As 
other representative examples see, MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 85–
108 (1994); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:  A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
(1998); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Professionalism, “. . . . In the Spirit of Public Service:”  
A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986); Hazard, 
supra note 1; Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
283 (1998).  
 61. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM:  ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 23 (2003). 
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The trouble with this line of reasoning is that even if lawyers today 
amount to “anxious hustlers” and are no longer “transcendent” statesmen, 
this fact does not self-evidently pose a broader social problem—especially 
in a society committed to democratic equality.  It might raise existential 
concerns for top lawyers who see themselves as political guardians, but 
their reduced social standing could arguably bring with it the elevation of 
popular citizenship.  In order to present the “crisis of values” as an actual 
social problem, Kronman and others find themselves presupposing the 
necessity of elite rule.  According to the statesmanship discourse, the bar’s 
elite will inevitably exercise political control and is in fact essential to the 
maintenance of a stable and healthy social order. Therefore, the current 
dilemma is not a growing divide between administrative experts who enjoy 
the privileges of leadership and most citizens who are increasingly 
separated from political power, but that elites have become less capable 
leaders.  Kronman writes, 
In the future, the legal profession will continue to supply a large 
percentage of the country’s political leaders.  But the demise of the 
lawyer-statesman ideal means that the lawyers who lead the country will 
on the whole be less qualified to do so than before.  They will be less 
likely to possess the traits of character—the prudence or practical 
wisdom—that made them good leaders in the past.62 
Rather than allowing the disappearance of “practical wisdom” among 
professional elites to raise foundational questions about the appropriateness 
of stratified citizenship, these arguments persist in hoping that lawyers can 
be made better rulers.  Thus, when Kronman calls for a legal practice 
oriented toward “the good of the law as a whole,” his call rests on an 
explicitly antidemocratic stance that divides elite and ordinary participation.  
Following the old republican vision, moral independence is considered to 
be an essential characteristic of virtuous rulership.  Thus, its defense 
through the lawyer-statesman ideal takes for granted both that lawyers 
should be elite citizens and that politics should be organized around a 
distinction between the few and the many.  In doing so, such claims 
abandon the ground of democratic legitimacy entirely to those who 
emphasize client autonomy and are opposed to an ethic of independence.  
They also ignore a critical reason for the profession’s loss of popular 
reputation.  What disturbs many Americans is not merely that lawyers use 
their influence poorly, but that the bar seems to exercise such profound 
influence in the first place. 
C.  The People’s Lawyer and the Countermajoritarian Turn 
It should be noted that not all accounts of the lawyer’s moral and political 
independence are grounded in an elite discourse of statesmanship or are 
principally concerned with whether lawyering remains a natural aristocracy.  
 
 62. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 4. 
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Scholars like Robert Gordon, William Simon, and David Luban self-
consciously seek to make the exercise of the lawyer’s independent 
judgment compatible with democratic institutions and commitments.63  
Each sees the most grandiose claims about the profession’s capacity for 
political leadership and its noble calling as antidemocratic defenses of legal 
privilege, based on historical suspicions of the poor and disenfranchised.  
For example, Gordon rejects as “ridiculous” the idea that “lawyers belong 
to a distinct elevated estate uniquely endowed with political wisdom and 
insight into everybody’s long-term best interests.”64  He refuses to read 
legal independence as an argument for elite empowerment and writes that 
“lawyering is not a club for superhumans, and that especially in this century 
lawyers have been joined, and in many areas of political life displaced, by 
rival interpreters and articulators and mediators of social purposes.”65  
Moreover, these scholars turn to Louis Brandeis’s seminal 1905 lecture 
before the Harvard Ethical Society, entitled The Opportunity in the Law, for 
their model of the “people’s lawyer” and seek to make professional 
independence an instrument for the fulfillment of popular needs and 
interests.66  But by claiming Brandeis as their inspiration, such arguments 
also fall prey to Brandeis’s own wariness of unchecked popular power.  
They carry through his vision of the people’s lawyer as someone who 
stands above ordinary citizens, and whose technical skill allows her to 
shape public demands. 
On its face, the desire to see legal practice as a means for articulating 
collective grievances appears far removed from the politics of legal 
statesmanship.  If anything, it ties the people’s lawyer as much to the 
tradition of social movement organizing as it does to that of ordinary legal 
craft—a move to which I am quite sympathetic, as will be discussed later.  
For Simon and Luban, the lawyer’s independence and professional 
discretion are essential political tools that, when exercised properly, 
enhance the agency and social power of marginalized groups.  Luban 
pictures lawyers and mass publics as ideally engaged in projects of “mutual 
political commitment,”67 and Simon presents the lawyer as an organizer 
 
 63. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 14; SIMON, supra note 60; Gordon, supra note 14. 
 64. Gordon, supra note 14, at 74. 
 65. Id. at 75. 
 66. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical 
Society (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 329 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) 
(1914).  All three scholars have been deeply influenced by  Louis Brandeis’s lecture.  Robert 
Gordon uses it at the beginning of The Independence of Lawyers as a definitive example of 
the professional ethic of independence. Gordon, supra note 14, at 2.  He also ends a more 
recent article on the state of the profession by returning to Brandeis’s vision of the 
“opportunity in the law” and the importance of lawyers to be more than autonomy agents for 
clients. Gordon, supra note 56, at 331.  William Simon’s account of “ethical discretion” 
draws directly from Brandeis’s view of lawyering for the situation. Simon, supra note 14, at 
1122.  Finally, David Luban’s account of how to reconcile the lawyer’s moral activism with 
democratic ideals is explicitly presented as an updating of Brandeis’s “people’s lawyer.” 
LUBAN, supra note 14, at 169–74. 
 67. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 329–35. 
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who “structures a situation to induce a sense of common interest, hope, and 
potency among the people she is trying to organize.”68 
In the end, however, rather than repudiating a politics of stratified 
citizenship, the ideal of the people’s lawyer simply devolves into a softer 
version of the legal guardian.  Like the statesmanship discourse, it reverts to 
a defense of professional independence in which the lawyer’s discretion 
constrains the vicissitudes of popular self-rule.  For instance, Luban argues 
that in class action cases, there often exists intergenerational conflict 
between the interests of present groups and those of future ones.  In this 
context, lawyers must use their independent judgment “to create the best 
possible world,” even if this contradicts the wishes of existing clients.69  As 
his example, Luban discusses Derrick Bell’s famous article, Serving Two 
Masters, in which Bell suggests that the effort by the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attorneys to pursue a 
vision of justice rather than the actual goals of their clients led them to file 
class action lawsuits aimed at desegregating schools—even though many 
black parents preferred improvements in educational quality to 
integration.70  Luban defends the attorneys on intergenerational grounds, 
arguing that the parents of the community engaged in short-sighted thinking 
and that “it is surely in the best interests of future generations to live in an 
integrated society.”71  In so concluding, Luban appears to ignore that the 
parents were also making pragmatic political judgments about the likely 
outcomes of various competing strategies.  In particular, such parents 
worried that the backlash fostered by forced busing would produce a worst-
case scenario, in which educational quality dropped in local schools and 
integration was never properly achieved.  It is an open and deeply contested 
question whether the parents or Luban have ultimately been correct about 
the best interests of future generations.  By simply dismissing parental 
judgments out of hand, Luban falls into the trap of presuming that lawyers 
are somehow better equipped than their clients to make difficult political 
decisions.  In the process, his argument for professional independence 
replicates precisely what Bickel viewed as the root of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty—it trumps the will of “the actual people of 
the here and now” with the deliberative judgment of elite actors.72  The 
consequence is that, like the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, the people’s 
lawyer also too often rests on an apology for legal privilege, with 
professional independence viewed as essential for directing and 
constraining popular voice. 
This tendency within the discourse of the people’s lawyer derives from 
the fact that proponents never actually situate legal discretion in a set of 
 
 68. Simon, supra note 18, at 1108. 
 69. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 348. 
 70. Id. at 347–48 (discussing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration 
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 17. 
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clear substantive goals.  While asserting the value of ethical autonomy in 
the abstract, Luban and others are wary of providing a thick moral ethos to 
guide legal practice.  The result is that people’s lawyering often only 
provides a formal defense of legal independence—it gives little sense of the 
social community within which lawyers should be embedded or the 
practical ends that should govern independent judgment.  This formalism 
means that when proponents seek to explain how professional independence 
operates, they tend to fall back on claims that legal practice and education 
somehow translate into enhanced capacities for prudence and ethical 
deliberation.  Without a democratic political theory to direct the exercise of 
professional discretion, the lawyer becomes exalted as a political actor 
capable of constraining the competing elements in society.  At its most 
extreme, people’s lawyering collapses—almost by default—into a system-
preserving function that checks popular impulses.73 
These problems are powerfully illustrated by Brandeis’s own accounts of 
democracy and legal practice.  At key junctures, Brandeis reproduces the 
classic distinction between the few and the many, and ties the lawyer’s 
independent judgment to the supposed leadership capacities of attorneys.  In 
drawing from Brandeis and in failing to move beyond formal defenses, 
Luban, as well as Gordon and Simon, unwittingly reinscribe the vision of 
elite authority that they otherwise take pains to condemn.  For Brandeis, the 
primary reason why lawyers were capable of thinking in terms of a greater 
good and “of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and 
the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either,” derived from their 
unique professional skills fostered by higher education and practical 
experience.74  These skills allowed the bar to remain a republican respite of 
prudence and practical wisdom in a broader social context of economic self-
interest and factional conflict.  In his opinion, the essence of legal 
training—as distinct from ordinary education—was the “the development 
of judgment,” in which attorneys learned the value of “patient research and 
develop[ed] both the memory and the reasoning faculties.”75  Such 
professional education gave attorneys special capacities for rising above 
discord and for pursuing right policy rather than divisive politics.  For 
Brandeis, it was this “training [that] fits [the lawyer] especially to grapple 
with the questions which are presented in a democracy.”76  He believed that 
the lawyer’s knowledge of law as a social science produced a set of moral 
characteristics that distinguished the legal profession from other forms of 
work.  It made attorneys ideally suited to wielding political power and to 
enjoying the responsibilities of elite citizenship.  According to Brandeis, the 
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lawyer “is an observer of men even more than of things.  He not only sees 
men of all kinds, but knows their deepest secrets; sees them in situations 
which try men’s souls.  He is apt to become a good judge of men.”77 
Albeit in a more gentle form, these arguments embodied an early-
twentieth-century updating of the long-standing republican position.  Even 
the call to train people’s lawyers by no means took the further step of 
assuming that most citizens should actually direct political decision making.  
Rather, the people’s lawyer acted on behalf of the best interest of ordinary 
individuals and guided political life so that mass politics would not devolve 
into chaos.  For Brandeis, while the public good should take account of the 
problems facing wage earners and agricultural workers, both corporations 
and the laboring masses were overly devoted to their partial interests and 
thus liable to reduce collective life to conflict and disorder.  Surveying the 
industrial strife around him, Brandeis hoped that attorneys acting as social 
experts could steer society toward a stable accommodation.  Like  
Tocqueville before him, Brandeis viewed the bar as the institutional entity 
best situated in a democracy to constrain the destructive impulses of 
popular power.  Speaking to his fellow lawyers of the threats posed by mass 
politics, he concluded, 
The people’s thought will take shape in action; and it lies with us, with 
you to whom in part the future belongs, to say on what lines the action is 
to be expressed; whether it is to be expressed wisely and temperately, or 
wildly and intemperately; whether it is to be expressed on lines of 
evolution or on lines of revolution.78 
In these few sentences, Brandeis echoed Madison’s fear of the 
“intemperance of a multitude” and acceded completely to the distinction 
between elite virtue and mass irrationality. 
In locating contemporary defenses of independence within the tradition 
of a people’s lawyer, Gordon, Simon, and Luban never squarely confront 
the republican discourse of elite citizenship on which this tradition is based.  
In fact, at times, they too ground a professional ethic of public service on 
the same arguments about the bar’s special capacities.  When justifying 
why lawyers can be trusted to use their judgment to act on the best future 
interests of clients, Luban returns to the old republican theme of elite 
leadership.  As part of his discussion of Brandeis in Lawyers and Justice, 
Luban concludes, “But it is not too farfetched to expect that legal training 
with its cultivation of practical judgment should enable lawyers to form a 
better picture of the human consequences of institutional arrangements than 
can those of us who have no comparable training.”79  By failing to find a 
substantive ethical ground for structuring a vision of professional 
independence, such arguments in favor of the bar’s independent judgment 
are inevitably trapped by the countermajoritarian difficulty.  Thus, for all 
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the dissimilarities between the ideal of the lawyer-statesman and that of the 
people’s lawyer, both find themselves offering an apology for professional 
power.  Given the apparent inconsistencies between lawyer discretion and 
popular self-rule, defending independence reduces to an effort to 
rehabilitate the profession’s legitimacy—in some cases by simply 
reasserting old presumptions about elite capacities.  As the following 
section indicates, this leaves the client-centered position as the only ethical 
stance seemingly untainted by a democratic deficit. 
D.  Lawyer Domination and the Call for Client Autonomy 
Echoing popular critiques of the profession as an unaccountable elite, 
client-centered approaches to legal ethics also make strange academic 
bedfellows of the Left and the Right.  What unites these scholars is a 
common view that professional discretion amounts to an illegitimate 
imposition of lawyer ends on clients.  While these arguments oppose an 
elite discourse of differentiated citizenship, they reduce democracy solely to 
electoral mechanisms or present accounts of citizenship that disconnect 
work life from political participation.  The consequence is that they too fail 
to ground legal ethics in a political theory that links the lawyer’s role to the 
requirements of a democratic culture. 
In the field of poverty law, academics and practitioners argue against the 
notion of a people’s lawyer committed to the best interests of marginalized 
groups, holding that such “lawyer driven decision-making” actually has the 
reverse effect of further diminishing the ability of those disadvantaged to 
assert their own political voice.80  These scholars reject a professional ethic 
based on the attorney’s independent judgment and focus instead on 
developing methods for “client empowerment.”81  They see ideals of 
independence and “disinterestedness embedded in traditional lawyering 
approaches” as means by which lawyers substitute their own goals for those 
of poor clients, in the process restraining, rather than facilitating, popular 
self-rule.82  In their view, given the inevitable countermajoritarian difficulty 
faced by an ethic of independence, the only way to conform legal practice 
to democratic values is by refraining from efforts to structure client 
objectives.  As Derrick Bell concludes in his discussion of NAACP 
lawyers, to do otherwise would constitute both inadequate representation 
and a profound form of democratic disrespect.  Instead of “undertaking 
responsibilities that should be determined by their clients and shaped by the 
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community,” he maintains that “[i]t is essential that lawyers ‘lawyer’ and 
not attempt to lead clients and class.”83  Similarly, poverty law scholar Ruth 
Buchanan argues for abandoning presumptions about the value of 
independent judgment and, as the only democratic option for lawyers, 
working “to rethink [one’s] own advocacy efforts in nonhierarchical 
ways.”84 
Legal academics on the other side of the political divide, who champion 
the value of the free market, have reached virtually identical ethical 
conclusions.  For example, Charles Fried views the belief that professional 
work should be marked by a disinterested commitment to the public good 
as “nonsense on stilts” and holds that the notion that attorneys have “a kind 
of distance, judgment and almost academic posture toward the law which 
allows them to serve clients particularly well” amounts to “a self-serving 
fantasy.”85  For Fried, the idea that lawyers provide a public function, 
which should temper one’s duty of client loyalty, carries with it 
unacceptable aristocratic assumptions.  It presupposes that lawyers are 
somehow better skilled than ordinary Americans in making collective 
judgments.  In his opinion, the only individuals who have the legitimate 
authority to make social decisions on behalf of others are elected 
representatives.  Since the bar has no similar democratic credibility, lawyers 
should not imagine themselves as political guardians; rather, they should 
operate as service providers in a legal market and orient their practice to 
fulfilling client goals.  Fried asserts that, not only does this market-driven 
ethic provide the best quality of legal service, but also that its flourishing 
indicates the community’s democratic health.  According to Fried, the 
belief that political life requires “a mediating priesthood between the 
regulators and the regulated is itself a sign of social illness,” suggesting 
deep distrust among professional elites for the everyday functioning of 
elected institutions.86 
Yet, as proponents of moral and political independence have illustrated in 
great detail, client-centered accounts are riddled with ethical and practical 
difficulties.  Robert Gordon emphasizes that the drive for client autonomy 
rests on a basic implausibility:  the notion that both client interests and the 
law’s self-evident meaning are fully formed in advance of legal consultation 
and thus all that lawyers must do is translate these interests into terms 
judicially accessible.87  By contrast, he underscores the irreducible 
discretion at the heart of legal practice, since even this process of translation 
generally requires the competent attorney to offer 
a number of possible alternatives that until that moment might never have 
been thought of, then asking for a ranking of alternatives, and then 
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estimating the possible consequences of each.  Through this back-and-
forth dialectical interaction, both the client’s ‘interests’ and the ‘law’ 
governing the situation will gradually take the shapes sculpted by the 
social agents who interpret and transmit them.88 
In this inherently dialectical encounter, having lawyers employ their own 
“political judgments,” which advocates of client autonomy view as 
illegitimate acts of domination, is “virtually inescapable.”89  William 
Simon goes so far as to refer to the fact that “effective lawyers cannot avoid 
making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their clients 
to adopt those judgments” as “The Dark Secret of Progressive 
Lawyering.”90  In other words, even when lawyers believe that they are 
simply following the predetermined goals of their clients, they are still 
constructing the meaning of these goals.  For Simon and Gordon, faith in 
client autonomy provides no end-run around the inevitable discretion 
embedded in legal work. 
Just as problematically, client-centered approaches, while claiming the 
mantle of democratic legitimacy, carry with them a remarkably hollow 
account of citizenship.  For example, Fried’s vision of democracy may not 
stratify citizenship between virtuous elites and irrational publics, but it too 
is premised on a truncated account of popular participation.  For Fried, most 
Americans simply pursue their private interests through the market and are 
utterly unconstrained by commitments to the general good.  Rather than 
envisioning a collective responsibility that colors all aspects of one’s public 
life, he implies that only elected representatives are tasked with the work of 
maintaining the vitality of political and economic institutions.  Under this 
view, democratic equality among social groups, and between lawyers and 
their clients, means that all are equally indifferent to the public interest.  
The people writ large merely pursue their own ends and displace concern 
for shared practices onto selected representatives.  Rather than elevating 
everyone to the level of practical decision maker—regardless of group or 
professional status—Fried’s market-oriented approach seems to do away 
with citizenship entirely as a meaningful popular category. 
As for fears of client domination arising from the Left, these also appear 
to embrace consequences that in fact undermine more robust possibilities 
for democracy.  In particular, the concern with client empowerment in its 
own way ignores the persistent inequalities in bargaining position and 
resources between dominant social groups and those less privileged.  As 
Simon makes clear, in actual practice, lawyers for wealthy individuals and 
corporations do far more than just translate client interests:  “they assist 
them in reflecting on their goals by offering a detached perspective, they 
give strategic advice, and they try to persuade third parties to support the 
client.”91  Asking attorneys for the disenfranchised to limit their own 
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discretionary judgment means reducing the already scarce resources of the 
disadvantaged.  While this may create the fiction of a nonhierarchical 
exchange between lawyer and client, it ignores the very reason that those 
without access to networks of legal and political power seek out lawyers in 
the first place—for advice when placed in situations of great vulnerability.  
Just as with market-oriented defenses of client autonomy, radical arguments 
employ democratic language to reach conclusions that compromise actual 
democratic values.  In this case, they seem to ask those lawyers most 
committed to enhancing the strength and social voice of marginalized 
communities to serve these interests without the benefit of their own 
considered judgment and knowledge—with one hand effectively tied 
behind their back. 
In the end, though, it is not surprising that both radical and free market 
versions of the client-centered account share similar intuitions—in 
particular, the notion that lawyer discretion is democratically illegitimate.  
As previous sections have explored, there no doubt exist antidemocratic 
elements in accounts of the attorney as an independent moral actor, even in 
those arguments that call for a people’s lawyer.  Given the parameters of the 
prevailing debate in legal ethics, we are left with a set of seemingly 
inescapable questions.  Is it possible to defend legal independence without 
relying on an underlying vision that separates between elite and ordinary 
citizenship?  Is the only way to avoid the profession’s countermajoritarian 
difficulty to transform the lawyer into a scribe or functionary of client 
interests regardless of the larger social costs?  Without a richer theory of 
democratic culture, the debate over the profession’s ethical commitments 
necessarily reinscribes this binary, in which lawyers must decide between 
democracy and moral autonomy but cannot have both.  Part II seeks a way 
out of this impasse, but not through an alternative conception of the 
lawyer’s practical duties.  Instead, it attempts to situate the lawyer’s ethical 
independence within a broader political theory, one which links to a long-
standing American tradition that usefully draws out the responsibilities of 
citizenship in work and politics. 
II.  THE LAWYER AS DEMOCRATIC LABORER 
Within the lawyer-statesman discourse, the view that work autonomy is 
crucial to a fulfilling professional life is central to the desire to protect legal 
practice as a noble calling.  Rather than being distinct from public life, the 
workplace for both the people’s lawyer and the lawyer-statesman is a key 
site for the expression of one’s social values and for the activity of 
citizenship.  While such arguments for ethical independence rightly 
maintain the importance and inevitability of discretionary judgment in legal 
practice, they hardly ever base their claims on a general defense of 
workplace autonomy in all its professional and nonprofessional settings.  
Instead, advocates of morally reflective lawyering often fall into the trap of 
reading the discretionary nature of legal work as both distinctive and a 
justification for elite leadership.  Client-centered accounts take just the 
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opposite tack, viewing the lawyer’s discretionary judgment as a democratic 
threat.  Rather than seeing work as the ethical foundation of political life, 
they present the two as essentially unconnected.  Moreover, as opposed to 
imagining ways to make the experience of professional autonomy a more 
generalized condition, they attempt to limit those few sites that do remain 
for the expression of workplace independence.  Both approaches seem to 
have lost sight of what previous Americans once saw as the heart of the 
democratic experiment. 
For an American political tradition that linked Abraham Lincoln to 
Jacksonian Democrats, independent judgment at work was considered the 
essence of free citizenship.  Such thinkers believed that a democratic 
society could not be marked by a distinction between a laboring mass and a 
class of educated decision makers.  Rather than viewing the lawyer’s 
capacity for independent judgment as the unique privilege of the learned, 
they sought to infuse all forms of labor with similar opportunities for moral 
deliberation and to imagine legal practice itself as one of many arenas of 
productive work.  In the following pages, I discuss how these arguments 
about the inseparability of learning and labor connected to broader 
expectations for robust citizenship.  Jacksonian and Jeffersonian critiques of 
the bar did not revolve around the legitimacy of independent judgment, but 
rather focused on the bar’s assumption that it embodied a distinct caste that 
enjoyed a monopoly on knowledge and deliberative authority.  According 
to radical Jeffersonian writers, these sentiments of a unique role actually 
weakened autonomy and had the reverse effect of tying the profession more 
closely to moneyed interests and distancing it from justice and the public 
good.  Thus, instead of repudiating the lawyer’s ethical commitments, as do 
some democratic critics of today’s bar, this previous tradition viewed 
workplace independence more generally, including lawyer independence, as 
essential to a vibrant democratic culture.  In recovering such arguments, I 
hope to move defenses of the lawyer as a moral agent beyond their reliance 
on an elite republican theory of politics. 
A.  Dewey, Lincoln, and the Ideal of Independence 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, philosopher John Dewey 
surveyed a political landscape that had shifted dramatically since his 
Vermont youth in the 1860s and 1870s.  Corporate concentration had 
drastically undermined popular power, and the new modes of mass 
communication similarly compromised the ability of ordinary citizens to 
intervene cogently in politics.  Moreover, these developments were 
reinforced by the rise of state bureaucracies and heightened governmental 
centralization.  In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey referred to the new 
social paradigm as the “Great Society,” an impersonal and increasingly 
authoritarian end product of the machine age and technological 
development.92  In response, Dewey hearkened back to a long-standing 
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democratic tradition that sought to instill the principle and practice of direct 
popular control within all collective institutions.  He wrote of the promise 
of democracy, 
From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible 
share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the 
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the 
values which the groups sustain.  From the standpoint of the groups, it 
demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony 
with the interests and goods which are common.93 
For Dewey, the democratic project was, at base, an effort in expanding the 
conditions of independence, ensuring that everyone had the opportunity to 
exercise discretion over which moral ends to pursue, whether in economic 
or political life.  Throughout the nineteenth century, such ethically directed 
work had been referred to as “free labor,” or as political theorist Michael 
Sandel writes, “labor carried out under conditions likely to cultivate the 
qualities of character that suit citizens to self-government.”94  By exploring 
what Dewey, and before him Abraham Lincoln, imagined by free labor, we 
can develop a better sense of how legal practice can connect to ideals of 
equal and authentic citizenship. 
For Dewey, the necessity that all individuals achieve moral independence 
at work and in politics meant that there could exist no permanent class of 
laborers, who went through life solely as dependent employees or rural 
tenants.  The problem with such activity was that it disconnected 
independent judgment and ethical reflection from everyday economic 
practices.  In Democracy and Education, he argued that a truly democratic 
community had to combine the activity of “producing commodities and 
rendering service” with the experience of “self-directive thought.”95  Under 
this view, democracy was more than simply a form of government; it was a 
general mode of social life that took as its basis the contention that all 
citizens should continuously engage in autonomous deliberation and thus 
cultivate the habits of self-discipline and hard work.  In particular, a 
commitment to universalizing moral independence meant doing away with 
old notions of a divide between virtuous elites and irrational publics, which 
cleaved “society into a learned and an unlearned class, a leisure and a 
laboring class.”96  With the aid of a reconstructed educational system that 
intertwined “culture and utility,”97  Dewey hoped to transform individuals 
into both laborers and thinkers capable of asserting a free and ethical will in 
public life.  This required rejecting all forms of aristocracy, “natural” or 
otherwise, including what he viewed as the most pernicious—the 
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emergence of a distinct class of professionals that saw learning as their 
exclusive possession.  As he concluded, 
The price that democratic societies will have to pay for their continuing 
health is the elimination of an oligarchy—the most exclusive and 
dangerous of all—that attempts to monopolize the benefits of intelligence 
and of the best methods for the profit of a few privileged ones, while 
practical labor, requiring less spiritual effort and less initiative, remains 
the lot of the great majority.98 
In rejecting any division between learning and labor,99 Dewey situated 
himself as an intellectual heir to no less a central political figure than 
Abraham Lincoln.  In Lincoln’s 1859 Address Before the Wisconsin State 
Agricultural Society, he argued that the “mud-sill theory” was more than 
simply a defense of slavery; it was also a claim about the imprudence of 
combining independent judgment with ordinary labor.100  He declared, “By 
the ‘mud-sill’ theory it is assumed that labor and education are 
incompatible” and that “the education of laborers, is not only useless, but 
pernicious, and dangerous.”101  Such education enhanced the intemperance 
and passions of the multitude and threatened the capacity of prudent elites 
to exercise collective power.  Under the “mud-sill” theory, Lincoln 
continued, “it is . . . deemed a misfortune that laborers should have heads at 
all,” which are “regarded as explosive materials, only to be safely kept in 
damp places, as far as possible from that peculiar sort of fire which ignites 
them.”102 
According to Lincoln, this view was premised on “[t]he old general 
rule . . . that educated people did not perform manual labor.  They managed 
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to eat their bread, leaving the toil of producing it to the uneducated.”103  In 
sharp contrast, the belief in free labor and moral independence took for 
granted the value of “universal education,” in which all individuals were 
raised to the level of deliberative and knowledgeable citizens.104  Lincoln 
maintained that, “as the Author of man makes every individual with one 
head and one pair of hands, it was probably intended that heads and hands 
should cooperate as friends; and that that particular head[] should direct and 
control that particular pair of hands.”105  Emphasizing the need to unite 
labor and learning, and to ensure that everyone participate in the practices 
of independent ethical judgment at work and in politics, Lincoln concluded, 
“[E]ach head is the natural guardian, director, and protector of the hands 
and mouth inseparably connected with it; and that being so, every head 
should be cultivated, and improved, by whatever will add to its capacity for 
performing its charge.”106 
Today, the tendency is to see arguments in favor of universal education 
as tied to a belief that all Americans should have the opportunity to rise in 
social standing.  This suggests that a democratic culture is one in which 
those most talented from all walks of life enjoy status as learned 
professionals, creating a true natural aristocracy based on merit and skill.  
For example, Gordon makes precisely this point in defending the value of 
the lawyer’s independent judgment.  While he admits that “the service ethic 
originated in the ideology of a privileged class” and that it “continued to 
justify the privileges of that class even when most of its members did little 
to live up to it,” he argues that the bar itself has been thoroughly 
democratized in recent years.107  Since legal education and practice are now 
pursued by communities long marginalized, a profession oriented toward 
the public interest no longer presumes that only specific social groups 
should exercise power.  “[L]awyers who seek fulfillment in public service 
are the children of patricians, professionals, academics, union members, 
political activists, members of victimized minority groups, graduates of 
elite and non-elite schools.”108 
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Putting aside the question of how close we are to achieving the 
meritocratic goal, even in its idealized form it is still far removed from the 
vision articulated by Lincoln or Dewey.  For them, democratization did not 
result from fluid social mobility, and education was not meant as an 
instrument for gaining higher rank.  Rather, the democratic hope was that 
common education at school, and most critically at work, would provide 
everyone with the chance to participate on an equal footing in economic and 
political life—regardless of standing.  As one Indiana school superintendent 
noted in 1875, “‘If we shall limit the education of the masses, and trust to 
the extended education of the few for directive power and skill, we must 
expect to be ruled by monopolies, demagogues and partisans.’”109  In fact, 
the wariness of distinguishing between an educated elite and a laboring 
mass led many nineteenth-century Americans to seek a thorough 
reformation of the legal profession—which some feared embodied an 
aristocratic and priestly class.  As the following section highlights, the goal 
of such reform was not the elimination of a morally reflective practice of 
lawyering, but an attempt to buttress the lawyer’s ethical autonomy by 
disconnecting the bar from elite interests and connecting it instead to the 
wider community of free laborers. 
B.  The Jacksonian Critique of Lawyering 
The Jacksonian period is often viewed by legal scholars as an era in 
which rural farmers, artisans, and their advocates attempted to eliminate the 
legal profession’s political independence and social power entirely, 
comprising what Roscoe Pound famously called “The Era of 
Decadence.”110  Spurred by the combination of universal white male 
suffrage and the relative equality of frontier life, the early nineteenth 
century witnessed the steady dismantling of the bar as a separate entity.111  
The colonial distinction between barristers and solicitors quickly collapsed.  
Bar associations, which had once asserted control over admission in parts of 
New England, either disappeared completely or were reduced to city 
associations of little political weight.112  Apprenticeships, at the time the 
only meaningful requirement for entrance to the bar, were either limited or 
abolished entirely.113  Historian Richard Abel writes that, 
In 1800, fourteen out of nineteen jurisdictions required all lawyers to 
complete an apprenticeship, often extending five years (the period then 
 
 109. SALVATORE, supra note 106, at 10 (quoting an Indiana school superintendent). 
 110. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223–49 
(1953). 
 111. This brief historical overview of the strains on the legal profession in the early 
nineteenth century draws from three key sources:  RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 
40–44 (1989); RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY:  AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 
OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 148–51 (1979); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH 
OF AMERICAN LAW:  THE LAW MAKERS 249–311 (1950). 
 112. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 40; POUND, supra note 110, at 223–24. 
 113. A few jurisdictions continued to have bar exams, but these were “usually oral and 
administered in a very casual fashion.”  See COLLINS, supra note 111, at 149. 
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required of most English solicitors); by 1840 only a third of the states did 
so (eleven out of thirty), and twenty years later the proportion had 
dropped to less than a fourth (nine out of thirty-nine).114 
These efforts reached a high watermark with Indiana’s 1851 constitution, 
which declared that, “Every person of good moral character, being a voter, 
shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice.”115  For 
the legal community, the tides of democracy had produced a startling state 
of affairs.  Professional institutions and lawyer control over admission had 
been thoroughly repudiated.  Even more remarkably, legal work itself was 
recast as a right of citizenship rather than a unique product of technical 
expertise. 
Yet, it is important to appreciate that these efforts were not meant to 
eliminate lawyering as a form of work, but instead constituted an attempt to 
unify labor and learning.  What Jacksonian politicians and their radical 
Jeffersonian predecessors opposed was the idea that lawyers constituted a 
separate educated caste, uniquely knowledgeable about collective life and 
privileged to intervene in politics.  The existence of such a social group 
presupposed a division of labor between what Dewey would eventually call 
“culture and utility,” and thus a rejection of the democratic project of 
universal moral independence.  When the social critic and Jacksonian 
pamphleteer Orestes Brownson argued for “the utter extinction of all 
privilege,” he saw his primary ambition as elevating each laborer to the 
level of autonomous citizen and decision maker.116  In words that Dewey 
would echo eighty years later, Brownson wrote, “There must not be a 
learned class and an unlearned, a cultivated class and an uncultivated, a 
refined class and a vulgar, a wealthy class and a poor. . . . There shall be no 
division of society into workingmen and idlers, employers and 
operatives.”117 
Two Jeffersonian thinkers, William Manning and Matthew Lyon, vividly 
conveyed the problems with the prevailing position of lawyers in early 
American public life, as well as how radical democrats imagined that the 
legal profession could be successfully reconstituted.  Manning was a self-
educated farmer of moderate status who lived in Billerca, Massachusetts 
until his death in 1814.  In the late 1790s he wrote a pamphlet entitled The 
Key of Liberty.118  Although unpublished in his lifetime, Manning’s text 
 
 114. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 40 (citing Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870, 5 
PERSP. AM. HIST. 403, 412–13, 417 (1971)). 
 115. HURST, supra note 111, at 250 (quoting IND. CONST. art. VII, § 21 (repealed 1932)). 
 116. Orestes Brownson, Brownson’s Defence:  Defence of the Article on the Laboring 
Classes, BOSTON Q. REV., at 1, 60 (Boston, Cambridge Press 1840). 
 117. ORESTES BROWNSON, Our Future Policy, in 15 THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. 
BROWNSON 124 (Harry F. Brownson ed., Detroit, Thorndike Nourse 1884). 
 118. William Manning, The Key of Liberty:  Showing the Causes Why a Free Government 
Has Always Failed and a Remedy Against It. Addressed to the Republicans, Farmers, 
Mechanics, and Laborers in America by a Laborer [1799], in THE KEY OF LIBERTY:  THE 
LIFE AND DEMOCRATIC WRITINGS OF WILLIAM MANNING, “A LABORER,” 1747–1814, at 117, 
117 (Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz eds., 1993).  For more on the life of William Manning 
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provides particular insight into popular understandings of how legal 
practice connected to democratic goals.  What makes the pamphlet so 
unusual is the fact that most ordinary farmers, not to mention the true rural 
poor, had limited educational means and rarely expressed their political 
views in writing at all, let alone with such depth and clarity.  Manning, like 
Brownson, Lincoln, and Dewey in later years, also saw free labor as 
essential to proper citizenship.  In keeping with many classical republicans, 
he argued that every society faced a basic divide between the majority of 
individuals, whose hard labor was “the parent of all property,” and a select 
few—landed gentry, merchants, and priests—whose wealth allowed them 
to live without laboring.119  Manning believed that such a leisure class 
embodied a constant threat to democratic freedom, just as did a permanent 
class of wage laborers. 
According to Manning, since these elites were skeptical of popular self-
rule and committed to maintaining a stranglehold on political authority, the 
self-interest of the privileged few necessarily led them to subvert public 
institutions.  For the small farmer or artisan, one’s property in land or tools 
was directly tied to an immediate experience as a laborer.  By contrast, for 
landed gentry and merchant elites, their wealth derived from income 
generated by the hard work of others, particularly tenants and employees.120  
In order to justify their position of privilege as members of a leisure class, 
Manning believed that such elites belittled the value of labor and 
championed idleness as a social good.  For instance, the landed gentry made 
arguments on behalf of hereditary aristocracy, claiming that only those 
removed from economic necessity or the experience of hard work were 
capable of thinking in terms of the common weal.  For Manning, because 
these elites lived off the labor of others, they possessed a fundamental 
interest in defending inequality and social hierarchy—and particularly, in 
protecting a divide between a leisure class and a permanent majority of 
dependent hirelings.  In his view, the American promise of free labor would 
remain plausible only as long as ordinary citizens were able to claim 
political power from such groups in order to protect their autonomy and 
independence at work. 
 
and his relationship to American politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
see Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz’s comprehensive essay introducing his collected 
writings. Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz, William Manning and the Invention of American 
Politics, in THE KEY OF LIBERTY, supra, at 3–86. 
 119. Manning, supra note 118, at 135.  All quotations from The Key of Liberty refer to the 
1799 version edited by Merrill and Wilentz, with grammatical and spelling corrections made 
including to the title. 
 120. Manning describes the self-interest of the few in these terms: 
As the interests of the Few—and their incomes—lie chiefly in money at interest, 
rents, salaries, and fees that are fixed on the nominal value of money, they are 
interested to have the money scarce and the prices of labor and produce as low as 
possible. . . . [T]he fall of the price of labor and produce, and the scarcity of 
money, always bring the Many into distress and compel them into a state of 
dependence on the Few for favors and assistances in a thousand ways. 
Id. at 137. 
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As for lawyers, Manning maintained that—like wage earners and 
tenants—attorneys also suffered from a condition of fundamental 
dependence, which posed a particular threat to the functioning of 
democratic institutions.  He wrote, “The greatest danger [to liberty] is from 
the judicial and executive departments of governments, especially from 
lawyers.”121  Since lawyers gained their livelihood from “fees and salaries,” 
they were often the functionaries of landed elites and thus extensions of 
their domineering authority.122  Rather than exercising independent 
judgment on behalf of the whole community, lawyers used their special role 
in legal and political life to maintain hereditary privileges and social 
hierarchies.  They did this by creating ambiguities in legislation, and 
employing these ambiguities to manage politics according to “the interests 
of the Few.”123  Manning believed that for Americans to exercise self-
government, ordinary citizens had to be able to discern and shape the laws.  
This meant that “[n]o care, pains, or precautions ought to be spared to make 
them as few, plain, comprehensive, and easy to be understood as 
possible.”124  Despite this need, the bar, due to its dependence on 
mercantile clients, made sure that “no person can understand what is law 
and what not but by applying to a lawyer.”125  The ultimate result was a 
steady erosion in the ability of citizens to direct the activities of public life. 
Writing at virtually the same time, Matthew Lyon further articulated why 
lawyers were so committed to defending elite interests.  Lyon was an 
outspoken Jeffersonian politician and journalist from Vermont who became 
famous as the first person brought to trial by the Federalists under the 
Sedition Act of 1798.  To this day, he is the only individual ever elected to 
Congress from jail.126  Throughout most of the 1790s, Lyon published a 
newspaper called the Farmer’s Library and wrote extensively about the role 
of lawyers in postrevolutionary America.  His most stinging attack was 
entitled Twelve Reasons, Against a Free People’s Employing Practitioners 
in the Law, as Legislators.  Lyon believed that the bar’s technical training 
actually undermined morally reflective legal practice because it cultivated 
the cultural ties between lawyers and the privileged few and fostered 
distaste for the capacities and commitments of most citizens.  Like 
Manning, Lyon viewed lawyers as unfree dependents of wealthy elites; they 
therefore stood up “for the claims of landlords, landjockies and overgrown 
land jobbers, in preference to the poorer sort of people.”127 
Yet, Lyon went further and argued that the reason why lawyers identified 
their interests with the privileged few was not simply because of material 
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 126. For more on Matthew Lyon’s remarkable life and career, see ALEINE AUSTIN, 
MATTHEW LYON:  “NEW MAN” OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, 1749–1822 (1981). 
 127. Matthew Lyon, Twelve Reasons, Against a Free People’s Employing Practitioners 
in the Law, as Legislators, FARMERS’ LIBR., Aug. 19, 1794. 
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dependence.  The very nature of legal training rejected the ideal of universal 
education, which held that all individuals should be equally skilled in 
practices of deliberation and self-rule.  By contrast, lawyers were taught to 
believe that they embodied a learned caste specially endowed with social 
knowledge and that popular citizens were rife with ignorance and 
destructive passions.  Moreover, while legal work should be seen as one 
form of labor among many, professional education led lawyers to 
consider themselves excluded from the solemn denunciation of our 
Maker; which says to man, that “in the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat 
bread,” an exclusion by which they [lose] the benefit of a qualification 
that legislators have; who by experience, and their own personal labors, 
have become acquainted with the feelings and the habits, as well as of the 
mode of thinking of their constituents.128 
Legal education trained lawyers in a Mandarin language whose purpose was 
to “mak[e] the laws obscure” and render ordinary political participation 
impossible.129  It taught lawyers that politics was a site for elite wisdom and 
that most citizens were fundamentally incapable of wielding collective 
authority.  It therefore bred in the bar a respect for hierarchy and deference, 
which threatened the basic principles of self-rule. 
In Lyon’s view, this tendency derived in part from the profession’s use of 
British common law as the foundations of its practice, which encouraged 
lawyers to see the oppressive and antiquated rulings of old English judges, 
rather than social need or everyday experience as the appropriate basis for 
the rule of law:  “They are early taught to revere the opinions of, and look 
up to, ancient British Judges, for authorities and presidents, who have 
derived their greatness and sucked their principles from the very poisonous 
breast of monarchy itself.”130  While members of the bar believed that this 
education promoted virtue and the capacities of statesmanship, Lyon argued 
just the opposite.  By teaching deference to a hierarchical past, it 
undermined the ability of lawyers to reflect autonomously on the public 
good and to see how discretion in legal work was tied to the larger 
democratic goal of universalizing free labor.  Combined with the 
profession’s financial dependence on the privileged few, extended 
education in the common law reinforced the bar’s tendency to reduce 
justice to the goals of wealthy clients.  Even when claiming to act in the 
interests of all, legal training stripped lawyers of the skills for independent 
reflection and undermined their ethical commitment to democracy. 
This view of lawyers as dependent laborers, not unlike wage earners or 
tenants, lasted long into the nineteenth century.  Nearly one hundred years 
after Matthew Lyon wrote his pamphlet on the bar, labor activists like 
George McNeil declared that lawyers had become little more than 
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“administrators of estates, and not of justice.”131  In other words, while 
legal practice inherently enjoyed opportunities for independent moral 
action, lawyers as a whole—due to education and practice—were incapable 
of thinking autonomously and acting on the basis of the common good.  
The profession’s dependence on the privileged few meant that most of what 
attorneys did amounted to settling financial disputes between elites and 
supervising the inheritance of wealth.  As “administrators of estates” they 
may have been more highly paid than wage employees, but they were still 
essentially dependent laborers. 
Thus, when Jacksonians during the “Era of Decadence” attempted to do 
away with specialized legal education and colonial era bar associations, 
they sought to disconnect the profession from a vision of itself as a priestly 
class.  Rather than being salaried dependents of the wealthy, they hoped 
that lawyers would situate their practice within communities of ordinary 
citizens and see their activity as a form of free labor that mirrored the 
autonomy of small property holders.  Instead of basing their practical 
judgments in common-law training, lawyers would see themselves as no 
different from other laborers who grounded their ethical commitments and 
knowledge in collective needs made evident by everyday experience.  For 
our purposes, the critical point is that Jacksonians and others did not 
consider democratic values to be incompatible with the lawyer’s exercise of 
independent ethical standards.  In fact, they believed just the opposite:  
sustaining a democratic culture meant ensuring that lawyers continuously 
reflected on the community’s basic interests.  Moreover, such a legal 
orientation would only emerge if two conditions were met.  First, lawyers 
had to become small proprietors who did not rely on elite benefactors and 
thus were financially independent of any social constituency.  And second, 
attorneys had to appreciate that the defense of their own ethical autonomy 
was intrinsically tied to protecting the free labor and economic 
independence of all citizens. 
C.  The Cultivated Thought of the Democratic Lawyer 
At first glance, President Abraham Lincoln appears to be an archetype of 
the lawyer as wise political guardian, playing a “transcendent” role in 
collective life.  Yet, in many ways, this presentation of Lincoln as 
republican statesman misreads his broader political theory, which 
fundamentally repudiated the stratified account of citizenship espoused 
(implicitly or explicitly) by Jefferson, Madison, Brandeis, and others.  It 
thus misconstrues his rationale for why the legal profession must be 
oriented toward the public good.  In particular, Lincoln’s vision of legal 
independence reinforced the long-standing goal of universal moral 
independence, which was present in earlier thinkers such as Manning and 
Lyon and in Jacksonian critics of professional privilege.  By reflecting on 
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this tradition as a whole, one can begin to assess the continuing relevance of 
past notions of democratic ideals and the lawyer’s ethical duties for today’s 
drastically changed circumstances. 
In the legal ethics debate, Lincoln is often presented as a classic example 
of how lawyers should be moral activists reflecting on the worthiness of 
their clients’ ends.  In his Springfield practice, he once famously told a 
prospective client, 
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole 
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her 
six fatherless children and thereby get you six hundred dollars to which 
you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to 
me, as much to the woman and her children as it does to you.  You must 
remember that some things legally right are not morally right.  We shall 
not take your case, but will give you a little advice for which we will 
charge you nothing.  You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man; we would 
advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other 
way.132 
For Kronman, the exercise of such judgment made Lincoln an exemplar of 
the ideal of statesmanship and illustrates the continuing capacities of the 
well-trained lawyer to serve as political guardians for our collective 
institutions.  In his view, Lincoln, the lawyer-statesman, acted on the basis 
of his learned reflection and wisdom, “his prudent sense of where the 
balance between principle and expediency must be struck.”133  Similarly, 
for Luban, Lincoln suggests the possibilities for a people’s lawyer to 
embody an exemplary “phronimos,” or Aristotelian moral expert, capable 
of appreciating the likely consequences of social action and thus directing 
clients and citizens toward the common weal rather than their private 
interests.134  In essence, both base Lincoln’s commitment to infusing work 
life with independent judgment in the lawyer’s distinct status as a learned 
professional who, unlike the ordinary individual, develops the qualities of 
deliberation and is thus suited for political and moral decision making.  In 
the process, these arguments tie Lincoln’s ethically reflective practice to 
older republican notions of stratified citizenship and transform Lincoln the 
lawyer into an embodiment of elite participation and virtue. 
Yet, for Lincoln, the lawyer’s exercise of ethical judgment was not the 
result of professional education and thus the possession of any natural 
aristocracy or distinct class of virtuous elites.  Rather, the lawyer, who 
enjoyed a small practice that served the needs of the local community, was 
at heart no different than a farmer or a craftsman.  He imagined that all free 
citizens, regardless of standing, should be “trained to thought[] in the 
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country school[] or higher school,”135 and that such training would instill in 
everyone an appreciation for the values of “book-learning,” which gave 
“access to whatever has already been discovered by others. . . . [and] a 
relish, and facility, for successfully pursuing the [yet] unsolved ones.”136  
When combined with the everyday experience of participating as equals in 
public life and of shaping the ends of their work life, such universal 
education would foster the skills of moral reflection and practical wisdom.  
According to Lincoln, and like John Dewey at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, this combination of learning and labor had the potential 
to create democratic citizens of remarkable intelligence and foresight.  In 
such a political community, legal craft would come to embody one more 
form of “thorough work”—labor that Lincoln believed united “cultivated 
thought” with the practices of ethical care, self-discipline, and 
comprehensiveness.137  Thus, when a lawyer made judgments about the 
worthiness of clients’ goals, he acted as a free laborer in a society of equals 
whose considered judgment grounded work life in the values of autonomy 
and critical self-reflection. 
Lincoln’s vision of the democratic lawyer took as given a variety of 
background conditions.  He imagined a world without extremes of wealth 
and poverty, in which virtually every citizen was a small property owner 
who situated his work life in local communities.  Under these 
circumstances, cultivated thought and thorough work would be accessible 
to all.  Lincoln declared, 
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, 
saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors 
on his own account another while, and at length hires another new 
beginner to help him.  This, say its advocates, is free labor—the just and 
generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way for all—gives 
hope to all, and energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to 
all.138 
By reconceiving the relationship between work and citizenship, Lincoln 
hoped that the old aristocratic divide between the few and the many could 
be overcome once and for all.  As a consequence, lawyers would no longer 
be the dependent subjects of elite benefactors or a priestly class claiming a 
monopoly on political knowledge.  Instead, they would constitute one 
category of free laborers among many, who employed discretionary 
judgment and ethical care to sustain collective institutions. 
One might argue that Lincoln’s defense of the lawyer’s moral 
independence—of a piece with Jacksonian hopes for a reconstructed ideal 
of legal practice—was tied to a set of social conditions that no longer mark 
contemporary life and whose disappearance renders this defense obsolete as 
well.  Indeed, bureaucratization and the rise of an industrial economy, 
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RANA FOR PP 3/5/2009  6:22:44 PM 
1702 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
which went hand in hand with the decline of independent proprietorship, 
present a clear challenge to imagining the modern bar as anything other 
than a distinct political class or a source of technical expertise.  
Nonetheless, the essential elements of this earlier democratic lawyer remain 
as relevant today as ever.  For one, they emphasize the centrality of 
embedding the legal profession within a community of citizens equipped 
with the material resources and cultural knowledge to intervene 
meaningfully in legal and political processes.  To the extent that most 
citizens understood how the law operated and had the economic 
independence to defend their interests and rights, professional discretion 
would no longer be a special privilege but would instead become simply 
one form of citizen autonomy. 
The remainder of this essay attempts to translate this professional vision 
into the present context.  I detail how institutional and intellectual shifts in 
the last century have radically altered the nature of American economic and 
political life and have stripped most citizens of a daily experience in 
collective self-rule.  I then turn to the role that lawyers qua lawyers may 
play in facilitating discretionary popular power and in expanding 
institutional sites for the broad exercise of moral independence.  This 
discussion focuses heavily on the relationship between attorneys and social 
movements, both during periods of citizen assertiveness and during times of 
organizational and collective retreat.  Such lawyers, acting on behalf of a 
democratic ethos, do so not simply as individual moral agents but as legal 
professionals committed to a specific account of the rule of law and its 
substantive aims.  This vision of the lawyer’s responsibilities is part and 
parcel of an alternative legal tradition, one that Manning, Lyon, and Lincoln 
struggled to situate as the basis of the rule of law. 
III.  LEGAL DISCRETION UNDER MODERN BUREAUCRACY 
Reflecting on the arguments of Lyon, Lincoln, and Dewey from our 
current vantage point, the idea of the legal profession as one among many 
economic and political sites for the exercise of citizenship and moral 
agency can appear quaint.  Lincoln’s nineteenth-century hope for an 
America composed of decentralized and producerist democracies has long 
since receded into the collective past.  In today’s environment of 
administrative complexity and bureaucratic governance, even the dominant 
accounts in legal ethics of independence and client control seem to 
overestimate the rationality and social knowledge possessed by both elites 
and ordinary citizens.  The rapid growth of specialization within the bar 
raises doubts about the capacity of contemporary attorneys to develop the 
generalized experience and cultural sensitivity that supposedly grounded the 
lawyer-statesman’s practical wisdom.  As for client-centered approaches, 
the rise of the administrative state and the insulation of most individuals 
from sites of political power challenge the extent to which clients—and 
citizens at large—are actually capable of recognizing their own interests, let 
alone coherently acting on them in legal and political arenas.  At present, if 
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the plausibility of even these truncated theories of democratic life is under 
assault, one is left to wonder what remains of more substantive 
commitments to self-rule. 
Over the next three sections, I elucidate both the difficulties and the 
possibilities for this democratic vision in the current moment.  I begin by 
exploring the bar’s prevailing concerns about its own democratic 
illegitimacy and the extent to which these concerns are tied to 
transformations in the relationship between legal and political life.  In 
particular, this discussion emphasizes the increased disconnect between the 
ideal of universal moral independence and the contemporary experience of 
diminished access to actual sites of political and economic decision making.  
In the second section, I highlight how these changes have fostered a 
profound pessimism among public intellectuals and legal scholars, 
exemplified by Walter Lippmann’s classic texts on public opinion, 
regarding the future of robust participation under administrative hierarchy.  
Legal ethics has not been immune to this pessimism, as some scholars 
wonder whether all that lawyers can do is serve as functionaries of the 
bureaucratic state and ensure that legal order is maintained—almost 
irrespective of the ends pursued by that state. 
By contrast, I argue that at present, the goal of the democratic lawyer 
should be precisely the opposite of defending the “authority of the law.”  
Instead, attorneys should employ their discretionary judgment to strengthen 
the capacity of social groups to intervene in administrative decision making 
and to create more participatory modes of economic and political 
governance.  Depending on whether strong social movements exist to 
channel popular sentiment, the lawyer’s approach to her discretion and to a 
community of citizens may well be distinct.  During periods of extensive 
mobilizing and collective self-assertiveness, the profession should focus on 
protecting the ability of groups to respond spontaneously to the decisions of 
elites and to create institutional frameworks for entrenching popular voice.  
To articulate how this might operate, I end by drawing from James Gray 
Pope’s excellent historical work on how labor lawyers in the 1920s and 
1930s developed approaches for defending the union’s right to strike139—
one such embodiment of popular political action.  I use the example as a 
thought experiment, which attempts to illustrate both the practical 
distinctions between democratic lawyering and alternative ethical 
approaches and the political stakes in how lawyers select between 
competing accounts of representation. 
 
 139. See generally James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 
941 (1997) [hereinafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution]; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:  Labor and the Shaping of American 
Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Pope, Thirteenth 
Amendment].  My description of the competing rationales for the right to strike is taken from 
a reading of these two articles, and thus is highly indebted to James Gray Pope’s research. 
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A.  The Attorney’s Role at the Intersection of Law and Politics 
As Part II explored, there is nothing inherent in the attorney’s legal 
discretion that makes it incompatible with popular self-government.  In fact, 
for the competing legal tradition developed by Jacksonians, the lawyer’s 
potential to exercise independent moral judgment provided a framework for 
how learning and labor could be combined in a society of autonomous 
citizens.  Today, however, the lawyer’s discretion carries with it a far 
different set of implications.  With the collapse of the social conditions that 
might have sustained a community of small producers, legal discretion has 
come to symbolize the separation of most citizens from practical decision 
making.  Moreover, it underscores profound uncertainty among public 
intellectuals and legal academics about the possibility of reviving 
participatory citizenship in the face of bureaucratic complexity.  This shift 
is in large part due to twin developments in the relationship between law 
and politics.  By delineating these developments, we can assess both the 
extent to which the profession actually faces a democratic deficit and the 
reasons for the increasing pessimism among scholars about the potential for 
a more substantive vision of democratic life. 
The first of these twin developments is that political practices and 
decision making in the United States are increasingly legalized.140  As 
critics of legal privilege like Gerald Rosenberg rightly point out, our most 
contentious social problems, from affirmative action and gay rights to 
emergency powers, have become matters of judicial adjudication in which 
lawyers play a central role.  This has made law into a primary discourse for 
articulating grievances and for expressing our political disagreements.  On 
the other hand, just as politics has become more legalized, the law itself 
seems subject to heightened political influence and control.  Nothing 
embodies this emergence more than the rise of “transformative judicial 
appointments,” the self-conscious use by Presidents of court nominations to 
construct an ideologically supportive federal judiciary.141  Legal actors 
themselves appear more and more like politicians, bound to networks of 
patronage and common policy.  In the words of Bruce Ackerman, post–
New Deal judges on both the left and the right are not traditionalists; they 
are in fact “prepared to support and elaborate a transformative vision of 
constitutional law.”142 
On initial inspection, neither of these developments are particularly 
novel.  American institutions and collective practices have long been 
marked by a remarkable interpenetration of law and politics.  Heightened 
legalization and the focus on law as a basic mode for decision making date 
back to the very beginning of the republic.  Political scientist Stephen 
Skowronek describes the early American state as one dominated by courts 
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and parties.  As he comments, “It fell to the courts at each level of 
government to nurture, protect, interpret, and invoke the state’s prerogatives 
over economy and society as expressed in law.”143  The result, as  
Tocqueville so famously wrote, was precisely the legalization of politics:  
“There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.  Consequently the language of 
everyday party-political controversy has to be borrowed from legal 
phraseology and conceptions.”144  For this very reason, American legal 
practice historically has been an inherently political enterprise.  Without the 
existence of a European-style civil service, legal activity in the United 
States often became indistinguishable from the political work of policy 
formation and statecraft.  Gordon remarks that “[c]orporate lawyers did a 
lot of the design of the legal forms of state-business relations that in Europe 
was done by central bureaucracies.”145  Moreover, the legal profession 
provided the United States with a substantial portion of its political class.  
In fact, 
[t]he work entrusted to senior career ministers in Europe devolved upon 
lawyers in the United States.  Since the founding of the republic, about 
two-thirds of the U.S. Senate and half the House of Representatives have 
been lawyers, and lawyers are the largest occupational group in most state 
legislatures as well.146  
It was for all these reasons that Jacksonians like Brownson were so wary of 
the legal profession and the capacity of the bar to institute itself as a learned 
class usurping collective authority and acting in the interests of a privileged 
few. 
Still, if the interpenetration of law and politics as such is hardly a new 
phenomenon, the contemporary moment is distinct for at least one crucial 
reason:  state and economic institutions have become far more intricate and 
disconnected from actual communities.  If the average citizen in the 
nineteenth century wished to see firsthand the workings of government, he 
simply had to visit two institutional spaces:  the local legislature and the 
courthouse.  The legislature provided easy access to the disagreements and 
competing goals of the community’s various social groups and political 
parties.  As for a trip to the courthouse, it allowed one to witness the inner 
workings of the state’s primary functions.  This was because, along with 
addressing ordinary civil and criminal cases, the courts “had become the 
American surrogate for a more fully developed administrative 
apparatus.”147  Importantly, both spaces were utterly public and readily 
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available to citizens in a local community.  Such publicity meant that not 
only could ordinary individuals keep continual tabs on the activities of their 
representatives, but they could also organize popular power spontaneously 
to intervene in decisions that were inimical to basic social needs—through 
actions ranging from petitions and protests to mobbings and court 
closings.148  All of these conditions checked the capacity of elites, including 
powerful lawyers and judges, to substitute their own will for a collective 
one.  Even members of a gentry bar, who saw themselves as republican 
statesmen wary of the multitude, were still largely rooted in particular 
communities and bound to other citizens—if for no other reason than by the 
capacity of local publics to assert a direct and immediate political voice. 
By contrast, the current interconnection of law and politics takes place 
against a backdrop in which the publicity and accessibility of key 
institutions are deeply limited.149  At present, administrative elites appear to 
have greater control over political and economic processes than ever before, 
with citizens largely removed from the arenas of decision making.  
Moreover, the political actors who operate at the center of these institutions 
are increasingly less rooted in local communities or the concerns of most 
individuals.  As public mediators between Americans and their judicial and 
political systems, lawyers in many ways typify such trends.  In particular, 
the stratification of the bar between elite attorneys who work on behalf of 
powerful clients in practice settings such as securities, corporate tax, and 
antitrust, and a lower tier who struggle to make a living and who provide 
legal services for debt, divorce, and immigration highlights the popular 
separation from actual political power.150  Those lawyers with the greatest 
wealth and opportunity to participate in decision making are often precisely 
those most removed from everyday interaction with average Americans.  
One could argue that in today’s profession the prestige and quality of 
representation is inversely correlated with actual human suffering or with 
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the lawyer’s location in a community of citizens.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that when the bar’s elite seeks to defend the profession’s independent 
judgment it turns to republican discourses of statesmanship and 
differentiated participation.  Due to prevailing hierarchies within the bar, let 
alone in society at large, the power and privilege of the most prestigious 
lawyers appear to have little in common with ordinary forms of citizenship 
or work life. 
These circumstances clearly place pressure on the potential of legal work 
to provide an example for universal moral independence.  Crucially, 
however, they put the dominant frameworks in legal ethics under severe 
strain as well.  Republican defenses of legal independence—calling either 
for statesmanship or a people’s lawyer—themselves rely on a vision of 
legal practice threatened by the rise of modern bureaucracy.  When 
Brandeis defended the wisdom of lawyers, he was specifically referring to a 
generalized legal practice, in which the attorney’s clients were not only 
corporate entities, but individuals of various backgrounds widely dispersed 
throughout society.  In his words, 
If the lawyer’s practice is a general one, his field of observation extends, 
in course of time, into almost every sphere of business and of life.  The 
facts so gathered ripen his judgment.  His memory is trained to 
retentiveness.  His mind becomes practi[c]ed in discrimination as well as 
in generalization.151 
By contrast, one is left to wonder whether a profession marked by 
specialization, in which the most prestigious attorneys hardly ever interact 
with individual clients, is similarly capable of prudent judgment and 
republican virtue—and therefore worthy of political leadership.  At the 
same time, client-centered approaches from the Left and the Right argue 
that lawyers should hew closely to client wishes because they take for 
granted that ordinary citizens understand their own interests and recognize 
how best to achieve them.  Yet, the very isolation of most individuals from 
political and legal institutions, as well as the increasing complexity of the 
administrative state, also leaves open the extent to which these assumptions 
are sustainable. 
This suspicion of the capacities of both lawyers and ordinary citizens 
means that, for some public intellectuals and legal scholars, collective life 
must aim much lower than a substantive democratic vision of participatory 
politics and continuous popular involvement.  As the next section discusses, 
in the legal ethics debate over professional independence, these views are 
implicit in a growing tendency to view lawyers as ultimately little more 
than civil servants of an administrative state.  W. Bradley Wendel and 
Daniel Markovits both see democratic politics under modern bureaucracies 
as subject to irreconcilable normative disagreements, which make social 
order fragile and a site for permanent instability.  In this context, all that 
lawyers can do is employ their discretionary judgment to contain collective 
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disagreement.  Rather than pursue their own autonomous moral ends or 
uncritically maximize client autonomy, the lawyer as bureaucratic servant 
remains faithful to the law of the administrative state, regardless of whether 
social institutions embody ideal ethical practices.  In many ways, these 
views underscore the sense that meaningful citizenship—in either elite 
republican or radical democratic varieties—are at root incompatible with 
the prevailing specialization and institutional hierarchy.  Thus, confronting 
such approaches is essential to clarifying what remains feasible about any 
account of legal citizenship, whether elite republican or democratic. 
B.  Lippman, Amateur Executives, and the Obedient Lawyer 
In order to appreciate fully the current pessimism regarding robust 
citizenship and popular self-rule, it is essential to begin with our country’s 
most unabashed and sophisticated twentieth-century critic of democracy, 
journalist Walter Lippmann.  Writing in the 1920s during the same period 
as Dewey, Lippmann too saw America as fundamentally distinct from the 
decentralized economic and political community it had been.  With the rise 
of an industrial economy, the growth of bureaucratic institutions, the 
increasing centralization of corporate power, and the emergence of 
professional groups such as doctors, social workers, teachers, and lawyers, 
society appeared more impenetrable than ever before.  While Dewey sought 
to conform the new landscape to long-standing respect for free labor and 
robust citizenship, Lippmann argued that the time was appropriate to put to 
rest—once and for all—popular faith in the value and sustainability of self-
government.  Over the last century, his arguments have become the 
theoretical touchstone for a vision of politics that de-emphasizes an ethics 
of citizenship and ties the practice of lawyering to specialized service in the 
activist state. 
In many ways, Lippmann’s efforts connected him to an elite republican 
discourse that dated back to the founding, which stressed the limits of 
ordinary citizenship and presumed the need for a separate political class, 
often comprised of lawyers.  However, Lippmann was also skeptical of the 
potential for professionals to embody a natural aristocracy capable of 
thinking broadly in terms of the general good.  In his view, specialization 
and hierarchy meant that most individuals, including administrative elites, 
had limited social experiences and were knowledgeable only about their 
immediate economic tasks.  As a result, groups such as lawyers should 
conceive of their role as serving a particular function within a complex 
social apparatus rather than as statesmen or wise rulers.  Instead of asserting 
its own independent and competing accounts of the public interest, the 
primary purpose of the bar was to uphold legal and political institutions and 
assist bureaucratic executives in distributing economic abundance. 
These arguments were a far cry from those offered by Brownson, 
Lincoln, or Progressives like Walter Weyl.  Weyl, who coedited the New 
Republic in the first decades of the twentieth century, contended that the 
problems of social complexity had to be addressed by elevating the citizen 
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and creating within individuals the ability to direct new institutions and 
economic practices.  Through the instrument of public education, Weyl, not 
unlike Dewey, hoped that all citizens could learn how to express their 
political will to elected representatives as well as how to bind new markets 
to actual consumer needs.152  More than protecting self-rule, he hoped that 
“[t]he higher education of the multitude . . . would create a revolutionary 
force in the community of astounding power and magnitude.”153  It would 
allow ordinary men and women to reclaim control “in their industrial 
pursuits, in their political activities, and in their private life outside of 
industry and politics.”154 
By contrast, Lippmann argued that any educational system committed to 
instructing the public at large in how to exercise practical authority was 
bound to fail.  Given the specialization of modern societies, the everyday 
citizen would always be an amateur when it came to politics, necessarily 
more concerned and knowledgeable about her own work and private life.  
Lippmann argued that, “[n]o scheme of education . . . can endow [the 
citizen] during a crisis with the antecedent detailed and technical knowledge 
which is required for executive action.”155  Thus, the purpose of a well-
ordered system of training was to prepare each individual for their allotted 
task within society’s division of labor.  If individuals could not be broad-
minded citizens oriented toward a general public interest, they could be 
made experts of a corner of the bureaucratic framework and thus able to 
perpetuate the smooth functioning of collective life.  According to him, 
American education had always been falsely tied to outmoded assumptions 
about omnicompetent citizenship, either elite republican or radical 
democratic, in which individuals were presumed to be capable of 
comprehending the entirety of social experience and thus acting on the basis 
of truth rather than mere opinion or conjecture.  Lippmann argued that 
nineteenth-century attitudes had “aimed not at making good citizens but at 
making a mass of amateur executives.”156  In his view, since administrative 
hierarchy was a social necessity, which any educative scheme had to 
appreciate, only those at the very top of the bureaucratic structure—his 
institutional executives—were required to access more comprehensive 
knowledge.  But crucially, even they relied on specialized experts rather 
than their own gathered wisdom for this knowledge, and so operated within 
the framework of society’s extensive division of labor. 
For Lippmann, when individuals, whose work life and general 
circumstances were narrow and highly distinct, pursued larger accounts of 
the common weal or invested politics with totalizing ideologies, the result 
was that they threatened social order and left public life “flounder[ing] in a 
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chaos of local opinions.”157  This danger was all the more relevant for 
professionals and specialized experts such as lawyers.  These groups 
possessed valuable knowledge in the functioning of particular institutions or 
bureaucratic practices and thus could help integrate society’s competing 
elements and factions.  Yet, when they acted on the basis of contested moral 
ends, or sought to champion the interests of particular groups, they simply 
aided the forces of chaos and instability.  In order to avoid these problems, 
Lippmann believed that Americans should in the end refuse to “hang[] 
human dignity on the one assumption about self-government.”158  Instead, 
he contended that government’s primary purpose was to distribute 
economic abundance, a task that experts, including lawyers, could perform 
through the operation of their own scientific knowledge and technical skill.  
Such a social order was the best that industrial societies could hope for and 
constituted a new variation of democratic life.  While this distributive 
community would no longer be grounded on meaningful self-rule, it 
nonetheless combined stability with a broad enjoyment of material and 
social goods.  Lippmann insisted that, 
The criteria which you . . . apply to government are whether it is 
producing a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of material 
necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not simply 
whether at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered 
opinions that happen to be floating around in men’s minds.  In the degree 
to which these criteria can be made exact and objective, political decision, 
which is inevitably the concern of comparatively few people, is actually 
brought into relation with the interests of men.159 
In this account of an activist state, Lippmann saw even the practice of 
voting, what Jefferson once viewed as the primary domain of ordinary 
citizenship, as playing only a marginal practical role.  For Lippmann, voting 
embodied the last widely accessible vestige of the nineteenth century’s 
commitment to popular participation.  Nonetheless, he argued that voting 
was ultimately not about expressing popular interests regarding the 
direction of collective life.  As suggested by his views of education, 
Lippmann believed that most people were ill equipped under industrial 
society to develop any political projects or to display collective agency.  
Therefore, “calling a vote the expression of our mind,” as Weyl maintained, 
was little more than “an empty fiction.”160  Instead, voting embodied a 
receptive act of selecting an already fully formed product.  He wrote, “The 
public does not select the candidate, write the platform, outline the policy 
any more than it builds the automobile or acts the play.  It aligns itself for or 
against somebody who has offered himself, has made a promise, has 
produced a play, is selling an automobile.”161  Citizens chose leaders from 
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lists of preapproved candidates and then departed the political stage, leaving 
actual policy questions to executives and those administrative experts 
scattered throughout economic and political institutions. 
In the current debates in legal ethics about the status of professional 
independence, one can see Lippmann’s own skepticism about democratic 
possibility and meaningful citizenship seeping into accounts of lawyering.  
In particular, two recent and thought-provoking assessments of the function 
of the bar in modern life are deeply animated by Lippmann’s distrust of 
popular participation.  In his article Civil Obedience, W. Bradley Wendel 
attempts to step outside the dominant debate between defenders of 
professional independence and their client-centered opponents, by offering 
a competing argument about how lawyers should exercise their inherent 
discretion.162  Like Lippmann, Wendel argues that society is marked by 
unavoidable ethical pluralism, or what he calls a “diversity of reasonable 
moral beliefs.”163  This pluralism makes the coordination of social activity a 
source of profound difficulty, and active popular participation a continual 
pressure on the sustainability of collective institutions.  Wendel argues that 
law’s primary purpose is to provide a framework for integration, one that 
contains the public’s “persistent moral disagreement.”164 
In this context, lawyers are neither independent moral agents nor solely 
the zealous advocates of their clients’ interests.  Instead, they are “quasi-
political actors” armed with significant public responsibilities; in particular, 
lawyers are meant to remain faithful to the law and to ensure that legal 
institutions resolve disputes in keeping with established rules.165  Given the 
fragility of political settlement, Wendel argues that the profession’s 
governing principle should be respect for the “authority of law”166 and its 
primary role to protect “social stability” from the ever-present danger of 
politics “slipping into either anarchy or a police state.”167  As Wendel 
argues, 
Under the authority conception of legal ethics, lawyers are duty-bound not 
to frustrate the achievement of law by reintroducing contested moral 
values into the domain of law, either in the guise of principles of 
interpretation or as the basis for an ethically motivated decision to act or 
not to act on behalf of a client.168 
Like Lippmann, not to mention elite republicans, Wendel imagines popular 
self-government as a “chaos of local opinions.”  The moral force behind his 
call for “civil obedience” is the fear that the public, when actively involved 
in politics, is as likely to promote disorder as it is to pursue any 
recognizable common good.  Yet, unlike Jefferson’s and Tocqueville’s faith 
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in natural aristocracy, Wendel also shows little hope that the legal 
profession has the prudence to navigate contested moral questions and to 
act on the basis of wisdom.  For him, the lawyer’s skill is merely enforcing 
the government’s interest in upholding the law, and thus the attorney is at 
root a bureaucratic functionary—a scribe not of the client but of the 
administrative state.  As such, Wendel carves out a particular path for how 
lawyers, in keeping with Lippmann’s vision of specialized expertise, may 
relate to their own capacity for discretion.  On the one hand, he concludes 
that lawyers should not pursue client interests that, although technically 
legal, undermine the larger authority of the law.  Nor, however, can they 
resist lawful aims for purely moral reasons.  In doing the latter, the lawyer 
would “simply reinscrib[e] in the attorney-client relationship the very moral 
disagreement the law was intended to preempt.”169  Instead, the attorney is 
under the permanent obligation, regardless of the administrative state’s 
actual ethical validity, “to preserve the common framework of law.”170 
In Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View,171 Daniel Markovits 
reaches surprisingly similar conclusions.  Like Lippmann, Markovits also 
maintains that the discrete social function played by lawyers makes them 
unlikely to display republican virtue.  In his view, the modern lawyer is an 
expert in the skill of argumentation and bound most closely to the 
established procedures and rules embedded in government bureaucracies.  
According to Markovits, the attorney’s “capacity to argue all sides and his 
allegiance to procedures rather than outcomes, makes him unsuited to moral 
leadership” as well as “render[s] him incapable of leading” political life.172  
Yet, in keeping with both Lippmann and Wendel, these very qualities also 
provide the attorney with unique skills within the administrative state for 
integrating diverse social elements and protecting public order.  For 
Markovits, this legal function as a bureaucratic servant is critical precisely 
because of the dangers posed by democratic politics.  Without mechanisms 
to regulate competing groups, “all forms of social order”173 would find 
themselves threatened by “the ‘perpetual conflicts between rival impulses 
and ideals.’”174  Given this fact, attempts by attorneys to act on the basis of 
their own moral autonomy would place the entire edifice of collective life in 
peril.  As Markovits concludes of the ideologically motivated or “realist” 
lawyer, “The realist lawyer cannot help the law preside over the conflict 
because she self-consciously declares herself to be outside of the law and a 
part of the conflict, and this is why modern society has never allowed all, or 
even most, of its lawyers to act like realists.”175 
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In the end, the vision of social life espoused by Lippmann, Wendel, and 
Markovits goes too far in repudiating both legal citizenship and popular 
participation, even acknowledging the pressures of heightened bureaucracy.  
They seem to suggest that contemporary politics is frequently and 
unacceptably on the precipice of disorder, and thus efforts by citizens to 
intervene in public life are as much a source of danger as they are one of 
potential renewal.  This implies not only a rejection of Lincoln’s 
commitment to universal moral independence, but also pessimism about the 
very possibility for politics to be a site for collective improvement.  In 
essence, such arguments, by invoking the specter of social collapse, 
undermine attempts to see political and legal frameworks as fundamentally 
malleable—the product of our own agency and thus open to reform or even 
transformation. 
Moreover, given their emphasis on respect for established rules, it is not 
surprising that Wendel and Markovits tend to read popular political activity 
as a form of unruliness.  Precisely due to the rise of modern bureaucracies 
and social complexity, collective action in twentieth-century social 
movements has inevitably moved “out-of-doors.”176  As Wolin notes, for 
most individuals, “[b]ecause of the exhausting demands of making a 
‘living,’ surviving under harsh circumstances, dedication to a political life 
is hardly a conceivable vocation.”177  By and large, most citizens have 
neither the energy nor the desire to develop the forms of specialized 
knowledge necessary to intervene cogently within the frameworks offered 
by administrative institutions.  According to Wolin, what reinforces this 
tendency is the fact that popular interventions are rarely triggered “by a 
yearning for political participation,” but instead emerge from “felt 
grievances” regarding one’s everyday circumstances and experiences.178  
As a consequence, political activity under modern bureaucracies is often 
“informal, improvised, and spontaneous”179—taking the shape of mass 
protests, extralegal assemblies, boycotts, petitions, and strikes.  From the 
perspective of the administrative state and Wendel’s obedient lawyer, these 
actions may well appear as threats to social integration.  Still, they also 
represent a genuine display of democratic sentiment about social ends and 
the course of collective life.  To the extent that modern hierarchies 
undermine local self-government as a general method of economic and 
political decision making, modes of mass dissent offer a critical avenue for 
sustaining democratic vitality.  In embodying what Franz Neumann once 
described as “spontaneous responsiveness to the decisions”180 of elected 
representatives and bureaucratic elites, such public pressure in both the 
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workplace and politics presents a central mode for social groups to 
intervene directly in institutional decisions. 
One concrete means by which the modern lawyer can fulfill the 
democratic hope of making legal autonomy a basis for widespread moral 
agency is to protect the public’s capacity for “fugitive” or “spontaneous” 
acts of political assertiveness during periods when social groups are 
politically active and engaged.  In many ways, this is precisely the opposite 
of envisioning attorneys as actors that employ legal process to dampen 
points of conflict and disagreement.  As Neumann wrote, democracy under 
conditions of mass bureaucracy “requires that social bodies such as political 
parties and trade unions remain free of the state, open, and subject to rank 
and file pressure; and that the electorate, if faced with serious problems, be 
capable of spontaneously organizing itself for their solution.”181  Since 
attorneys find themselves at the intersection of law and politics, they can 
employ their discretionary judgment to enhance and protect the conditions 
by which popular groups express their own democratic energy.  In doing so, 
lawyers do not use their moral and political independence to act as prudent 
leaders in the long-run best interest of other social groups, as both 
Tocqueville and Brandeis imagined.  Rather, in defending sites for popular 
discretion and dissent, modern lawyers can see ethical autonomy in work 
and politics as a broad social good, as opposed to the purview of 
professional elites alone. 
C.  The Strike, Popular Citizenship, and the Democratic Lawyer 
Perhaps the strike is the most classic informal means by which citizens, 
organized as employees, challenge the prerogatives of corporate and 
administrative employers.  Such challenges are of utmost importance in 
contemporary democratic life, particularly given the general loss of control 
experienced by wage earners since the entrenchment of modern 
corporations.  In essence, the strike embodies a remaining form of 
discretionary popular power that allows citizens to assert their own 
authority over the economic domain.  No doubt, legal questions 
surrounding the right to strike present only one potential embodiment of 
how lawyering connects to popular power and assertiveness.  Still, the topic 
provides a clear issue area in which to delineate the practical differences 
between competing legal ethics frameworks—such as people’s lawyering, 
client-centered views, and Wendel’s model of “civil obedience”—in the 
context of mobilized and self-assertive constituencies.  As a launching 
point, I revisit James Gray Pope’s research on how Progressive attorneys 
addressed the constitutional arguments of their unionist clients in the years 
prior to and during the New Deal—a peak of labor organizing and activity.  
This discussion is not an effort at historical reconstruction; rather, it 
employs the basic contours of the events Pope describes as a fact pattern for 
thinking through how lawyers might have behaved differently under similar 
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circumstances.  As a thought experiment, the example illuminates the extent 
to which distinct schools of legal ethics, including the democratic ethos I 
espouse, recommend alternative approaches for an attorney’s interaction 
with her clients and with social movements.  Each account of legal ethics 
implies divergent understandings not only of how lawyers relate to their 
political communities, but also of the strike’s social meaning and legal 
status. 
Pope’s work presents a basic dilemma in the purpose of legal advocacy, 
one that labor attorneys were continually confronted by in the early decades 
of the twentieth century.  Unions perceived the right to strike as a crucial 
element in their ability to resist employers equipped with far greater wealth, 
resources, and relative bargaining position.  Furthermore, unions saw the 
strike as essential to sustaining the wage earner’s economic and ethical 
independence under vastly changed conditions.  If laborers could no longer 
directly dictate how their labor was to be employed, at least they could use 
spontaneous and collective power to reassert some degree of economic 
control.  For labor leaders ranging from Samuel Gompers to Andrew 
Furuseth and John Lewis, the strike was believed to be a fundamental right, 
given constitutional life by the Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription of 
“involuntary servitude.”182  According to unionists, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bailey v. Alabama,183 invalidating the state’s debt peonage law, 
stood for the claim that the Thirteenth Amendment sought “‘to make labor 
free by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is 
disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit.’”184  They argued that the 
individual worker by himself was helpless against the combined power of 
corporate institutions.  The strike, as a form of popular political action, not 
only protected individual employees against the coercive strength of their 
employers, but also established the moral conditions for free labor.  As 
Pope writes, it provided workers with “‘effective freedom,’” or “the ability 
not only to influence the conditions of working life, but to do so 
consciously, in combination with one’s coworkers, using forms of action 
that yield immediate, unambiguous evidence of personal and collective 
potency.”185 
Yet, Pope tells us that overwhelmingly the lawyers who represented 
union clients and were supportive of labor legislation rejected such political 
and legal reasoning as the basis for defending the right to strike.  Like Felix 
Frankfurter—who was eventually appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
the Supreme Court—these Progressive and New Deal attorneys were 
steeped in Brandeis’s vision of a people’s lawyer and committed to 
constraining the power of corporate interests in the defense of general 
public good.  But, rather than presenting the strike as a fundamental right 
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embedded in the Thirteenth Amendment—in either the court or the public 
sphere—union attorneys decided to emphasize Congress’s commerce power 
as a basis for pursuing labor legislation.  Instead of a matter of basic 
constitutional freedom, Frankfurter and others framed the strike as part of 
the broad category of “economics,” which under the Commerce Clause 
depended for its legality “‘upon a judgment about practical matters’” made 
by Congress.186  As Frankfurter asserted, “‘[T]hat which is reasonably 
defensible on economic or social grounds, whether or not it accords with 
our individual notion of economics . . . cannot be offensive on 
constitutional grounds.’”187  By the end of the New Deal, arguments 
grounded in the Commerce Clause gained the status of unquestioned law 
and came to undergird the legitimacy of various labor provisions, not least 
of which was the right to strike.  In the process, they also ensured that the 
strike would never achieve the level of a fundamental right, but rather 
would rest upon “the ordinary political process subject only to deferential 
review by the courts.”188 
This example raises the basic issue of whether the attorneys should have 
developed an approach to legal representation that affirmed the 
constitutional vision asserted by their unionist clients.  From today’s 
perspective, the answer seems fairly straightforward.  The entrenchment of 
the New Deal’s legal account of the activist state makes reasoning from the 
Commerce Clause appear as the self-evidently correct strategy.  At present, 
it would be the only legally viable approach; for a contemporary attorney to 
argue otherwise might well evince a basic lack of professional competence.  
Given the current state of the law, a focus on other legal rationales could 
actually contravene guiding ethical commitments to providing clients with 
adequate representation.189  However, the power of Pope’s historical 
exegesis is to demonstrate that in the years preceding the New Deal, both an 
argument from the Commerce Clause and from the Thirteenth Amendment 
were highly controversial.  If anything, Thirteenth Amendment reasoning 
had more popular purchase and embodied a key means by which both 
unions and their allies in Congress spoke of the right to strike.190  Each 
constitutional approach would have been deeply inconsistent with existing 
Supreme Court doctrine, which emphasized economic due process, limited 
the power of Congress to intervene on behalf of labor, and viewed such 
efforts as unconstitutional “class legislation” that violated Fourteenth 
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Amendment principles of equality.191  Under these conditions of judicial 
hostility, one could imagine thoughtful practitioners taking seriously the 
unionist vision of constitutionalism and constructing a legally savvy 
analytical framework to enable arguments from the Thirteenth 
Amendment—whether they be directed at judges or fellow citizens.  As one 
element of such a framework, lawyers could show how fundamental rights 
need not be absolute; as with freedoms of speech and assembly, the reality 
of heightened scrutiny may well be compatible with legislative 
infringement.  The fact that union attorneys chose not to pursue this path 
ultimately had far less to do with self-evident success or failure in court, 
especially given that Commerce Clause arguments only eventually 
succeeded as a result of profound political changes during the Great 
Depression.192  In essence, the ideological commitments of the profession at 
the time shaped in advance what such lawyers deemed politically 
appropriate and possible.193 
Given that prevailing doctrine questioned the legitimacy of both 
accounts, what does the representational approach actually pursued by 
attorneys indicate about how they related to union clients and perceived the 
meaning of their own discretion?  In light of Pope’s historical work, the 
debate over the status of the strike provides a thought experiment for 
imagining the practical implications of different approaches to legal ethics.  
To begin with, unionist attorneys—self-conscious embodiments of the 
people’s lawyer—approached this dilemma in a manner that might be 
familiar from this essay’s discussions of Luban and Simon.  Rather than 
shying away from the realities of ethical discretion, they sought to expand 
the space for the lawyer’s own moral agency and political independence.  In 
thinking about this discretion, it is important to appreciate that whether the 
unionist constitutional vision amounted to legal strategy or client goal was 
itself deeply contested.  Today’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
assert that while a “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation,” he or she has wide latitude in developing the 
means for achieving these objectives.194  Yet, here, it remained unclear 
precisely how to distinguish between client objectives and lawyer means.  
Were the unions interested in solely vindicating the right to strike no matter 
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the rationale, or in championing an account of fundamental rights protected 
by the constitution?  For American Federation of Labor (AFL) leader 
Andrew Furuseth, it was acceptable in crafting federal legislation to make 
compromises concerning everyday politics.  However, he saw the right to 
strike as a fundamental value, for which there could be no legislative 
compromise.  As Pope quotes him, Furuseth believed that the strike should 
be seen as comparable to hallowed freedoms such as speech.  On these 
matters, legal strategy and client objective merged because “there [could 
be] no half loaf on fundamental principles. . . . Whether a man or woman 
shall belong to himself or herself or not is fundamental, as is the question 
whether or not that man or woman shall have a right to combine with others 
for the purpose of mutual aid.”195 
However, exercising his professional autonomy, Frankfurter and others 
read client ends narrowly, as committed solely to legalizing the right to 
strike regardless of its constitutional status.  While unions may have had 
suggestions about legal strategy, it was the province of technical experts to 
reach broad judgments about how best to pursue this far more limited 
objective.  Perhaps more importantly, the lawyers’ strategy was invested 
with deep political meaning.  Like Brandeis, Progressive and New Deal 
attorneys viewed themselves as acting in the best-considered interest of the 
public writ large and thus as a crucial check against all competing factions.  
As one such lawyer commented, the bar “‘alone of all the orders of men 
represents not force but justice, not caprice but law.’”196  To argue for a 
fundamental right to strike based on the Thirteenth Amendment would have 
been considered antithetical to the lawyer’s unique responsibility as social 
guardian to constrain mass publics when popular action veered from the 
presumed common weal.  It was to place laboring groups above the good of 
the people as a whole.197  For this brand of people’s lawyering, attorneys 
embody a natural aristocracy whose education and technical skill 
supposedly imply practical wisdom and prudent judgment.  Thus, when a 
lawyer behaves as an independent moral agent, her agency devolves into a 
form of republican elitism, in which she sees herself as acting on behalf of 
client interests—but more broadly and “temperately” construed. 
Both Wendel’s account of “civil obedience” and client-centered 
lawyering are similarly prey to problematic conclusions.  Committed to the 
“authority of law,” Wendel’s lawyer placed in this union representational 
context would defend the right to strike, but ideally by employing strategies 
that preserved the finality of legal settlement.  In other words, he would—in 
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this case, not unlike the people’s lawyer—deemphasize the discretionary 
popular authority of social groups to challenge the framework of procedural 
legitimacy.  A fundamental right to strike, grounded in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, would expand the discretionary power not of government but 
of labor; it would thus potentially destabilize the finality of law and reopen 
divisive moral disagreements.  By contrast, client-centered accounts would 
likely present a competing approach.  According to this vision of legal 
ethics, Progressive lawyers should have acted to reduce to a minimum their 
independent discretion and therefore followed both the political ideals and 
practical strategy presented by unions.  Treating clients nonhierarchically 
would entail rejecting lawyer presumptions of superiority, regardless of the 
reality of technical specialization, and attempting to operate as an 
instrument actualizing the client’s already fully formed will.  At the 
extreme, the lawyer might pursue client-articulated strategies even if they 
would be significantly less effective than those suggested by expertise.  
Equally importantly, the lawyer would effectuate client ends broadly 
understood, even if they compromise a more substantive vision of 
citizenship and democratic life. 
What might a democratic ethos indicate as a way to organize the 
attorney’s representational approach?  As with the people’s lawyer, this 
viewpoint refuses to negate the bar’s autonomy or to confine citizenship 
solely to an electoral domain distinct from everyday employment.  As such, 
it sees professional discretion as more than an extension of technical 
expertise.  But unlike with legal statesmanship or people’s lawyering, moral 
agency is not defended out of a belief that lawyers possess (or should 
possess) prudence.  Rather, independence is defended to the extent that it 
promotes a particular substantive principle and is exercised in a manner that 
is consistent with democratic ambitions.  Thus, a defense of the lawyer’s 
own ethical agency and reflectiveness is essential to meaningful 
citizenship—to protecting and expanding the sites that remain for citizens 
to enjoy autonomy over decisions that shape their lives in work and politics.  
In keeping with the arguments of Manning, Lyon, and Lincoln, the lawyer’s 
individual discretion is taken as an exemplar of the forms of independence 
that should be invested throughout social institutions. 
To the extent that dictates of competence allow, or that the democratic 
ideal is relevant to the particular representational context, this ideal should 
infuse and organize a lawyer’s advocacy inside and outside the courtroom.  
Given the fact that the lawyer exists at the intersection of law and politics, 
representation almost inevitably involves a wide range of practices.  As part 
of negotiation, client counseling, and trial advocacy, lawyers find 
themselves (self-consciously or not) developing a legal discourse that often 
structures what arguments and modes of reasoning become politically 
available.  This means that lawyers must be attentive to the public 
consequences of both their larger advocacy approach and their particular 
legal strategies, and have the flexibility to use their discretion accordingly. 
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In some cases this might involve reading client ends narrowly while in 
others it might mean just the opposite. 
To return to Pope’s strike illustration, a democratic defense of 
professional autonomy would mean taking a more expansive approach to 
client ends.  Under conditions in which organized social movements 
confront entrenched and centralized bureaucracies, strengthening 
democratic life is crucially tied to whether these groups can act informally 
and extraprocedurally to contest the decisions of elites and to propose their 
own solutions to collective problems.  The strike embodies a definitive 
expression of such discretionary popular power, and its protection is a 
crucial avenue for a mobilized mass constituency to act independently of 
the directives of economic and administrative authorities.  In other words, 
the reason for defending the Thirteenth Amendment approach would not be 
to avoid “client domination” or to create a “nonhierarchical” practice 
encounter.  Due to the specialization that marks contemporary institutions, 
there is no avoiding the reality that lawyers have superior technical skills in 
legal domains.  The challenge is how to make those skills serve critical 
social ends, in particular efforts to extend the capacity of citizens to dissent 
from those features of social life they find oppressive.  The reason why 
Progressive lawyers should have pursued the Thirteenth Amendment 
argument as their primary focus is because it would have shaped the manner 
in which their own clients and the public in general—not simply judicial 
actors within the courtroom—conceived of the meaning of their collective 
practices.  During a period of energized popular participation, imagining the 
strike as a fundamental right, rather than as a prerogative of congressional 
power, would have shifted the framework for political discussion and 
activity.  Such democratic lawyering would have highlighted and sharpened 
the essential disagreements between competing social elements and 
reinforced the capacities of popular groups to dissent from established 
practices. 
On first glance, it might appear counterintuitive that the lawyer, who 
Wendel primarily tasks with upholding the authority of the law,198 should 
instead be committed to expanding discretionary popular power and thus 
the ability of citizens to impose their goals—even if it means acting outside 
government’s procedural framework.  Yet, on closer inspection, this vision 
of the democratic lawyer is not incompatible with respect for legality.  As 
has been argued previously, such lawyering is itself steeped in a long-
standing legal tradition, one that articulated the ties between participatory 
citizenship and the domains of law and politics.  This tradition provided 
generations of political and legal actors with an account of the lawyer’s 
place in a community of citizens.  While the rise of corporate institutions 
and the administrative state may have undermined the social conditions for 
robust citizenship, this alternative legal framework still underscores the 
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RANA FOR PP 3/5/2009  6:22:44 PM 
2009] STATESMAN OR SCRIBE? 1721 
duty of lawyers in their professional role to take seriously the aspiration to 
broad moral autonomy. 
Moreover, at present, the ability of social groups to act spontaneously to 
assert their own interests and grievances has declined sharply.  In this 
context, in which the central social movements of the twentieth century 
have largely collapsed as means for organizing and expressing popular 
dissent, democratic lawyering cannot simply rely on protecting sites for 
spontaneous action or maintaining the separation between government and 
society.  The profession must actively participate in generating new 
organizational structures for the articulation and enactment of constituent 
goals; it must also help to reform the administrative state itself to include 
far greater opportunities for participatory intervention and governance.  In 
the final pages of this essay, I draw out the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities 
for creating the social conditions necessary for robust citizenship inside and 
outside the framework of everyday legal representation.  In doing so, I hope 
to suggest how linking professional discretion to a vision of democratic 
community allows the lawyer to exercise her autonomy in ways that move 
well beyond the prevailing binary between statesman and scribe. 
CONCLUSION:  THE LEGAL ROLE TODAY IN REVIVING DEMOCRACY 
The current debate in legal ethics over whether attorneys should be 
independent moral actors or client-centered autonomy agents presents a 
strangely upside-down account of democratic life.  Those who defend 
independence assume the role (often unwittingly) of apologists for the bar’s 
countermajoritarian status.  Rather than tying legal deliberation to the 
democratic goal of elevating all citizens, their argument for moral discretion 
rests on a theory of elite republicanism and promotes assumptions about the 
virtue of professional leadership.  Today’s most outspoken defenders of 
democratic legitimacy in legal ethics appear to conclude just the reverse, 
namely that ethical independence for the lawyer is incompatible with self-
government.  If nothing else, this essay hopes to recast the debate by 
situating the lawyer’s ethical activism within a richer account of 
participation and autonomy.  Throughout the nineteenth century, a wide 
spectrum of American thinkers and political actors sought to reject notions 
of political elitism and natural aristocracy, and instead imagined a social 
community that combined labor and learning to inculcate citizenship with 
practical control.  Jacksonians, and their radical Jeffersonian predecessors, 
saw the legal profession as both a threat and a potential aid in pursuing this 
democratic promise, and hoped that lawyers could be persuaded to employ 
their own moral agency to enhance that of their fellow citizens.  In the face 
of massive transformations that undermined the historical frameworks for 
everyday economic and political participation, twentieth-century public 
intellectuals questioned whether this earlier vision remained feasible.  In 
this context, it is not surprising that some legal scholars today are 
increasingly pessimistic about either the moral capacities of the bar or the 
potential for citizens to construct and impose an actual political will. 
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Still, in our era of mass demobilization, in which social movements have 
in large measure receded as mechanisms for organizing dissent and 
presenting ideological alternatives, the responsibilities placed on the bar are 
more pressing than ever.  Today’s dominant discourses revolve around 
either the security claims of the state or the market dictates of corporate 
entities.  Given the prevalence of these modes of authority, the profession 
can employ its own social power to speak on behalf of a distinct set of 
values and to interject these values into our shared practices.  In particular, 
it can employ its discretion to strengthen the social bases required for 
participatory citizenship and thus to link lawyering to a democratic 
community.  Such professional efforts should take place both at the 
macrolevel of pursuing policies that open up the legal and political system 
to greater contestation and popular involvement, and at the microlevel of 
reframing client relationships in times of demobilization. 
To begin with, this means confronting the complexity and seeming 
impenetrability of prevailing institutions and reclaiming the radical 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian hope of creating more transparent and 
accessible legal processes.  Following Manning, Lyon, and Brownson, such 
a template highlights the importance of simplifying the legal system and, 
perhaps counterintuitively, enhancing the capacity of individuals to defend 
their interests without recourse to lawyers.  Recall that in legal ethics 
discussions, the fear of domination, emphasized in radical client-centered 
accounts, rarely refers to the lawyer’s interactions with corporate entities or 
wealthy individuals.  Simon points out that for powerful clients—although 
lawyers clearly do much more than merely translate their interests—the 
exercise of this discretion hardly indicates that attorneys are in a position of 
superiority.  Precisely because powerful clients have an array of 
independent material and cultural resources, legal discretion actually 
extends rather than compromises their capacity to pursue selected ends; if 
anything, it makes lawyers the dependents of wealthy benefactors.  By 
contrast, for poor or disenfranchised clients, both the lack of independent 
resources and the fact that legal services are generally provided through 
private markets dramatically alter the nature of client-attorney encounters. 
For many Americans, inequalities in legal access often reduce the courts 
to a space for harassment and vulnerability, instead of a means for asserting 
one’s rights.  In her book Access to Justice, Deborah Rhode presents a 
picture of a legal system in which 
[m]illions of Americans lack any access to justice, let alone equal access.  
According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of 
the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income 
individuals, remain unmet.  Government legal aid and criminal defense 
budgets are capped at ludicrous levels, which make effective assistance of 
counsel a statistical impossibility for most low-income litigants.199 
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Under these circumstances, Richard Zorza tells us that, “[i]n many courts, 
well over 50 percent of litigants appear without lawyers.  For example, in 
California, a court study found that in child support cases, only 15.95 
percent of the cases had counsel on both sides, and that in 63 percent of 
cases neither parent was represented (let alone the children).”200  Moreover, 
the bar’s general solution to such systematic inequality—increasing the 
number of attorneys for the poor through government funding and greater 
pro bono hours—only underscores the depth of the problem.  Over the last 
thirty years, government subsidies for legal services have dropped 
dramatically, as national spending on legal aid has dipped by one-third and 
heightened restrictions have been placed on both the types of clients and the 
causes that state-supported lawyers can pursue.201  As Rhode writes, 
federally funded programs often refuse to represent clients deemed 
“unworthy,” a category that has expanded over time to include “prisoners, 
undocumented aliens, women seeking abortions, and school desegregation 
plaintiffs.”202  Yet, Russell Pearce notes that even with far greater 
government support, equalizing access simply by increasing the number of 
lawyers is an inherently flawed strategy.  To begin with, providing quality 
service to all low-income individuals would require dramatically increasing 
the number of lawyers, perhaps by as much as tenfold.203  Moreover, to the 
extent that market relations still dictate the primary provision of legal 
services, “[p]arties with greater resources would be able to purchase a 
higher quality of legal services and better absorb the costs of litigation.”204 
Of equal importance, simply increasing the number of lawyers would not 
shift how the legal profession is currently embedded in communities.  At 
present, to the extent that poor or marginal litigants have attorneys at all, 
these attorneys are often either high-priced corporate lawyers engaged in 
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pro bono practice205 or, more commonly, legal aid advocates with limited 
time or money to devote to representation.  Each circumstance emphasizes 
the vulnerability of the client as well as the sense that the lawyers involved 
do so out of noblesse oblige or a vision of public service—one that actually 
reaffirms elite republican notions of excellence and professional leadership.  
Rather than a fundamental good experienced by all, the protection of basic 
rights often devolves into a philanthropic grant impermanently and 
unequally distributed.  This reality embodies Manning’s central fear about 
the bar’s potential role in American life:  namely, that the legal system 
would become so complicated and riddled with material disparities that 
most individuals would have neither the capacity nor the opportunity to 
defend their rights and interests as equals in the public arena.  Faced with 
these conditions, citizens would be incapable of comprehending—let alone 
controlling—their own institutions and thus become entirely dependent on 
forms of elite leadership. 
In reflecting on the present moment, radical Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
calls for greater simplicity present one practical means for strengthening the 
social prerequisites necessary for a democratic community.  Rhode, Zorza, 
and Pearce all focus on methods of enhancing the ability of individuals to 
make sense of the legal system and to articulate their rights in court, even 
without the aid of lawyers.  Such scholars argue for expanding the use of 
small claims courts; they also defend “implement[ing] proposals to place 
self-represented parties who cannot afford a lawyer on more equal footing 
by providing them with basic information on the law and procedures, as 
well as . . . forms and . . . assistance in drafting pleadings and other court 
papers.”206  These changes would go hand in hand with moving the judge 
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permit handwritten petitions and electronic filings; others offer hotlines, on site 
childcare, and form preparation assistance through websites and computer kiosks.  
A growing number provide at least some personal assistance in multiple languages 
for pro se litigants through centers in courthouses, community organizations, or 
even traveling outreach units.  A few jurisdictions have substantially raised the 
dollar limits of small claims courts, offered assistance to their users, and banned 
appearances by lawyers in all cases or in proceedings where the opponent is 
unrepresented.  Such reforms should be more widely adopted and courts should 
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toward a more active role—especially in pro se litigation—by ensuring that 
parties fully understand the nature of proceedings and settlements as well as 
by remedying procedural errors that would keep courts from hearing crucial 
evidence or legal arguments.207  Again, at stake would be more than 
confronting the inequities in legal access.  Greater simplification would 
expand the cultural resources at the disposal of most individuals and help to 
reframe how clients confront both the legal system and the bar.  By 
spreading legal information and access widely, these changes would help 
reconstruct the manner in which lawyers are situated within communities.  
While clearly only a limited step, they seek to ensure that when the bar 
exercises its legal discretion, this discretion takes place against a backdrop 
in which citizens too possess knowledge about their governing institutions 
as well as some measure of autonomy in court practices. 
In fact, these attempts to simplify legal process and expand citizen 
resources should be considered part of a broader reform effort to expand 
popular participation throughout regulatory institutions, wherever such 
participation can be made feasible and institutionally effective.  Given the 
centrality of lawyers within the administrative state, the legal profession has 
the opportunity to promote regulatory mechanisms and policies consistent 
with what political scientist Archon Fung has called “accountable 
autonomy.”208  This approach combines devolution, in which citizens have 
extensive authority over social decision making, with centralized 
monitoring—mitigating pathologies both of administrative hierarchy and 
local parochialism.209  In describing recent participatory experiments, Fung 
highlights how administrative actors and local groups have attempted to 
solve problems of bureaucratic failure by drawing on constituent knowledge 
and involvement in areas often viewed as too complex for ordinary 
citizenship.  At the municipal level, these examples include the 
development of neighborhood councils in Chicago to address challenges in 
public education and policing, which by the late 1990s incorporated 
 
develop policies, training, and monitoring structures to promote fair treatment of 
unrepresented parties. 
RHODE, supra note 199, at 86. 
 207. For more on injecting adversarial processes with a “managerial judge,” see Russell 
Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:  Revisiting the Roles of the 
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987–92 (1999); Pearce, supra 
note 203, at 975–79; Zorza, supra note 200, at 440–48.  
 208. See ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION:  REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 
5–8 (2004). 
 209. Id.  Such institutional approaches are comparable to what Michael Dorf and Charles 
Sabel have described as “democratic experimentalism.” See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).  They 
argue for a vision of participatory politics in which 
subnational units of government are broadly free to set goals and to choose the 
means to attain them.  Regulatory agencies set and ensure compliance with 
national objectives by means of best-practice performance standards based on 
information that regulated entities provide in return for the freedom to experiment 
with solutions they prefer. 
Id. at 267. 
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thousands of local residents into the direct activity of allocating budgetary 
resources and developing basic policy strategies.210  In the context of 
federal environmental regulation, often seen as far too intricate for popular 
intervention, reforms to the Endangered Species Act have created 
participatory processes by which stakeholders including developers, 
community groups, and environmental activists work jointly to create 
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs).  According to Fung, “[t]hese plans aim 
to devise durable ecosystem-management strategies that simultaneously 
protect endangered species and allow human development.”211  Such 
experiments in participatory governance, alongside a transformation in 
court process, suggest the type of macro-reform initiatives that can reduce 
administrative complexity and strengthen the social conditions for 
widespread self-rule. 
Ultimately, however, moving courts away from an exclusive orientation 
toward lawyers and altering regulatory processes only speak to one side of 
the current predicament.  Attorneys themselves must confront the meaning 
of their own legal practice at a historical moment when professional 
autonomy is no longer a widely shared experience but rather an elite 
privilege.  With the decline of broad-based social movements, democratic 
lawyering also requires far more than what it might have during the heyday 
of labor activism.  Rather than focusing simply on informal or spontaneous 
modes of social pressure, it means no less than employing one’s 
professional power and experience to help construct the very associations 
and institutional frameworks—inside and outside of the administrative 
state—that can house popular participation.  As articulated by Scott 
Cummings and Ingrid Eagly, such an emphasis on “law and organizing” 
entails that attorneys “focus their efforts on facilitating community 
mobilization.”212  But unlike with some “law and organizing” approaches—
often associated with radical client-centered views—lawyers should not 
refrain from infusing their practice with a guiding normative vision out of 
fear that it may lead to client domination.213  By returning once more to the 
classic debate between Bell and Luban over class action litigation, we can 
highlight how such a substantive focus provides attorneys with methods 
 
 210. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright argue that such neighborhood councils have 
“created the most formally directly democratic system of school governance in the United 
States.  Every year, more than 5,000 parents, neighborhood residents, and school teachers are 
elected to run their schools.  By a wide margin, the majority of elected Illinois public 
officials who are minorities serve on these councils.” Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, 
Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:  
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3, 8 (Archon 
Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003). 
 211. See FUNG, supra note 208, at 234. 
 212. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 80, at 447. 
 213. Cummings and Eagly note that when grassroots initiatives are too beholden to 
postmodern fears of client domination, they avoid constructing any “comprehensive 
alternative social vision, which ultimately prevents them from developing institutional 
structures and challenging the hegemony of liberal capitalism.” Id. at 486. 
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both for avoiding the statesman-scribe binary and for combining 
professional obligations with broader democratic commitments. 
At the heart of the Bell-Luban debate over whether NAACP lawyers 
should have pursued their own accounts of the best interest of black parents 
was the reality of what Rhode calls “class conflicts in class actions.”214  
Parents represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund themselves 
disagreed deeply over the proper framework for confronting the racial 
discrimination embedded in the American education system.  As previously 
discussed, to some extent these disagreements were practical and concerned 
simply whether integrationist strategies like busing would actually enhance 
or reduce the overall quality of schools.  Yet, Gary Peller powerfully 
captures how black communities were also torn between two competing 
ideological visions of racial equality.215  On the one hand, groups like the 
NAACP advocated an integrationist stance that “locate[d] racial oppression 
in the social structure of prejudice and stereotype based on skin color, and 
that identifie[d] progress with the transcendence of a racial consciousness 
about the world.”216  Thus, NAACP attorneys informed local communities 
that they would refuse desegregation cases unless integration was a central 
objective.217  On the other hand, Peller notes that many in black 
communities opposed the idea that race consciousness should be overcome 
at all.  Articulating a commitment to black nationalism, these individuals 
“asserted a positive and liberating role for race consciousness[] as a source 
of community, culture, and solidarity to build upon rather than 
transcend.”218  As Malcolm X famously argued, all-black schools need not 
be viewed as the product of discrimination: 
[I]f we can get an all-black school, that we can control, staff it ourselves 
with the type of teachers that have our good at heart, with the type of 
books that have in them many of the missing ingredients that have 
produced this inferiority complex in our people, then we don’t feel that an 
all-black school is necessarily a segregated school.  It’s only segregated 
when it’s controlled by someone from outside.219 
Neither Luban’s nor Bell’s ethical accounts of legal representation offer a 
compelling method for attorneys to navigate these ideological 
disagreements.  Without offering a serious argument, Luban essentially 
stipulates as a matter of fact that the integrationist ideology amounted to the 
long-term best interest of the class as a whole and that the NAACP lawyers 
 
 214. Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1211 
(1982). 
 215. See generally Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758. 
 216. Id. at 759–60. 
 217. See Rhode, supra note 214, at 1216.  Rhode notes that in one Pennsylvania school 
case, “Legal Defense Fund attorneys indicated that they would not represent the plaintiff 
class if its objective was simply to upgrade ghetto schools rather than to achieve 
desegregation as well.” Id. at 1213 n.121. 
 218. Peller, supra note 215, at 761. 
 219. Id. at 763–64 (quoting Malcolm X, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY:  SPEECHES, 
INTERVIEWS AND A LETTER 16–17 (G. Breitman ed., 1970)). 
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were right to pursue their own moral worldview regardless of the actual 
community of parents.  In his view, the matter was self-evident:  “a racially 
integrated future is better than a racially segregated one.”220  Not only does 
such presumptuousness collapse into legal-statesmanship at its most high-
handed, one could also argue that it fails to represent adequately the 
litigation class that would be affected by desegregation suits.  Given that the 
NAACP was the only organization pursuing class actions, its effective 
monopoly meant that black parents opposed to the integrationist approach 
had no viable legal alternative and would have to live with court remedies 
to which they fundamentally objected but were nonetheless instituted on 
their behalf.  As Bell notes, this embodied a situation in which lawyers 
contravened the spirit of ethical rules stipulating that attorneys should keep 
their personal interests from interfering with client representation.221  
Unfortunately, Bell’s solution of following parental dictates is equally 
problematic.  By simply transforming the lawyer into a functionary for 
those parents already mobilized, his client-centered approach would have 
done little to guarantee that legal representation conformed to the wishes of 
the class as a whole rather than an active minority within it. 
By contrast with each of the preceding frameworks, democratic 
lawyering sees the creation of processes for participatory citizenship as a 
potential solution to class disagreement.  According to this competing 
ethical approach, attorneys should have pursued the formation of inclusive 
parental associations, aimed at offering a mechanism for black communities 
to consider distinct ideological visions of racial equality and to discuss the 
likely educational outcomes.  Particularly at a juncture in the civil rights 
movement when mobilized constituencies were receding from the public 
sphere, lawyers had the opportunity to develop organizational frameworks 
to sustain popular involvement.  Such frameworks, which harness citizen 
voices, ensure not only that client goals are actually assessed but also that 
any exercise of independent judgment by the lawyer is part and parcel of a 
more general exercise in popular discretion.  As a consequence, organizing 
drives would have been far more broad-ranging than the plebiscites or 
public hearings courts often employ to poll class views.222  Historically, 
open meetings in school desegregation cases yielded very poor turnout—a 
fact that is unsurprising given the exhausting work and family demands 
 
 220. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 348. 
 221. Under the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
the bar’s ethical model at the time, 
[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of 
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences 
and loyalties.  Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the 
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client. 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1983) (citing ABA CANONS OF PROF’L 
ETHICS Canon 35 (1908)).  
 222. On the limits of court-imposed “majoritarian” solutions to problems of intraclass 
conflict in class action litigation see Rhode, supra note 214, at 1232–42. 
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placed on many low- and middle-income Americans.223  Crucially, these 
public hearings were not part of larger collective projects, which tied 
parental involvement to clear mechanisms for pursuing their interests.  
While the difficulties of mobilizing poor constituencies have been well 
documented,224 organizers also have numerous tools at their disposal to 
foster meaningful participation.225  In deciding how to strengthen parental 
voice, lawyers could have employed their own judgment to decide which 
tools would best promote associational activity.  In a context like school 
desegregation—in which parents were deeply invested in the future of their 
schools and previous civil rights associations were decaying—a judicious 
combination of organizing practices had the possibility of renewing 
participatory energy.  At their best, such efforts may have provided the 
seeds for more permanent institutions, affording local communities with a 
setting for asserting control over key social and political decisions. 
Crucially, this mode of legal organizing not only fulfills the democratic 
commitment to disperse moral autonomy widely, it combines such 
commitments with the lawyer’s duty to provide competent legal 
representation free of conflicting interests.  To the extent that associations 
were inclusive and created fair procedures for generating and voicing 
collective demands, these parental groups could have articulated which 
client ends to pursue—integrationist or black nationalist—in class action 
lawsuits.  There is no doubt that ideological disagreements would be deep 
and potentially impossible to overcome.  Nonetheless, making such 
disagreement explicit—rather than cloaking it by imposing a false 
normative agreement—would still have played a critical function.  In the 
case of sustained opposition, it would have made apparent the internal 
tensions within the community and highlighted the professional 
inadequacies of majoritarian polling solutions or of simply bundling all 
parents together.  By the same token, the opportunity to engage with 
ideological disagreement may well have produced the opposite effect—
emphasizing shared interests and affording parents a framework to reach 
consensus over questions of profound social significance.  In each case, the 
lawyer’s role in promoting participatory mechanisms would have tied duties 
of representation to the goal of robust citizenship.  Moreover, one should 
note that this entire process would have been permeated by professional 
 
 223. Rhode tells us that, “[i]n a Pittsburgh school desegregation case, 25 to 30 individuals 
out of a class of 2,000 students and 4,000 parents typically attended open meetings.” Id. at 
1234 n.207. 
 224. Along with Rhode’s discussion in Class Conflicts in Class Actions, supra note 214, 
at 1234, see also political theorist Carole Pateman’s seminal account of the reasons for low 
levels of participation among marginal social groups. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND 
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by attempts to mobilize welfare recipients in the welfare rights context see PIVEN & 
CLOWARD, supra note 176, at 296–354. 
 225. Cummings and Eagly discuss a variety of strategies for enhancing low-income 
participation including educational efforts, signature gathering, demonstrations, media 
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building. See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 80, at 480–84. 
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discretion, evident in everything from initial efforts at organizing to 
constructing strategies needed to implement stated ends. 
By creating mechanisms for popular participation, such democratic 
lawyering provides one example of how legal independence can embody a 
general social template.  Unlike the lawyer-statesman, the focus on 
organizing does not presume that the lawyer’s moral independence derives 
from unique insight into how best to reconcile ideological disagreements or 
to construct a general public good.  And, in contrast to radical client-
centered accounts, the attorney need not shrink from her position of 
technical expertise and independent judgment.  Instead, the democratic 
lawyer ties the profession’s irreducible discretion to a guiding substantive 
principle—the desire to instill all economic and political arenas with 
opportunities for popular decision making.  In doing so, the attorney, in his 
or her own legal practice, combines duties of competent representation with 
an overriding democratic ethos.  By drawing from a long-standing legal 
tradition, such lawyering suggests that a commitment to moral 
independence—if grounded by a political theory that gives substance to the 
meaning of this independence—need not be trapped within the rubric of 
statesman or scribe. 
In reorienting the ethical commitments of the profession, the lawyer’s 
own independence and discretionary judgment can be a potential basis for 
social renewal.  The problem with most accounts in legal ethics that attempt 
to take democracy seriously is that they fail to address the consequences of 
the public’s separation from the sites of political authority.  With powerful 
economic actors as well as the state’s coercive capacity seemingly 
unrestrained by popular sentiment, the legal profession—if armed with 
political and moral independence—has the opportunity to supply a critical 
check on elite institutions.  When legal scholars seek to limit the lawyer’s 
discretion as an ethical actor, they not only do a disservice to the ideal of 
morally reflective work, they also further negate those tools still within 
reach for challenging the hierarchy of contemporary practices.  Just as for 
past Americans, the ultimate ambition of legal independence must be to 
protect the democratic promise at the core of collective life.  At present, we 
are clearly a long way from the hope of citizens equally engaged in and 
reflective about their work lives and political conditions.  As a result, the 
project facing both lawyers and the public at large is ultimately one of 
recovery.  This task entails reclaiming lost democratic ground and 
safeguarding essential building blocks of autonomy and moral 
independence—both inside and outside of legal practice.  These building 
blocks are imperiled not by the expression of popular power, but instead by 
its notable absence. 
 
 
